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Valerii Salov
Abstract
The prospects of Kahneman and Tversky, Mega Million and Powerball
lotteries, St. Petersburg paradox, premature profits and growing losses
criticized by Livermore are reviewed under an angle of view comparing
mathematical expectations with awards received. Original prospects have
been formulated as a one time opportunity. An award value depends
on the number of times the game is played. The random sample mean
is discussed as a universal award. The role of time in making a risky
decision is important as long as the frequency of games and playing time
affect their number. A function of choice mapping properties of two-point
random variables to fractions of respondents choosing them is proposed.
1 Introduction
Мы выбираем, нас выбирают.
Как это часто не совпадает!
(We make the choices, we are selected.
Often intentions are misdirected!)
Mikhail Tanich
(VS’ translation)
Decision-making under risk attracts attention of economists for a long time
[21] [7], [30], [1], [44], [3], [45], [15], [51], [16], [46, Chapter 3]. The mathematical
expectation of profits and losses in a game or trading is not always the main
factor influencing decisions [4], [6], [18], [31], [17], [45], [15], [51], [53], [54], [16],
[46], [34], [36], [52], [39, Chapter 4], [43]. Understanding the nature of award in a
game and construction of suitable measures for comparing awards and choosing
between games is a challenging task. Here, the certainty of sample mean profits
and losses and play time are considered with respect to decision making.
2 Problem 3 from Kahneman and Tversky
Based on Maurice Allais’s research [1], Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky [15,
p. 266] found out that 80 percent of 95 students and university faculty preferred
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Prospect B in Problem 3: choose between (A) 4,000 Israeli pounds received with
80 percent of chance and (B) 3,000 for sure. 3,000 were the median net monthly
income. Studying these results, the author knew how to compute mathematical
expectations [23, pp. 57 - 69, Chapter IV Mathematical Expectations]. It is
equal to 1× 3, 000 + 0× 0 = 3, 000 for B and 0.8× 4, 000 + 0.2× 0 = 3, 200 for
A. Esteeming the extra 200, he mentally joined the majority declining the gift.
Kahneman and Tversky label this phenomenon the certainty effect. In Problem
3, 80 percent choosing B is its experimental measure. Can the probability theory
match theoretically the experimental fractions of respondents?
Two-Point Distribution represents a random variable ξ with two outcomes
Ap, Aq and probabilities 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, q = 1 − p. Its mathematical expectation
E(ξ), variance D(ξ), third central moment µ3(ξ), fourth central moment µ4(ξ),
skewness γ1(ξ), excess kurtosis γ2(ξ), and entropy H(ξ) are
E(ξ) = α1(ξ) = App+Aqq = (Ap −Aq)p+Aq, (1)
D(ξ) = µ2(ξ) = E([ξ − E(ξ)]2) = E(ξ2)− α1(ξ)2 = (Ap −Aq)2p(1− p), (2)
µ3(ξ) = E([ξ − E(ξ)]3) = (Ap −Aq)3p(1− p)(1− 2p), (3)
µ4(ξ) = E([ξ − E(ξ)]4) = (Ap −Aq)4p(1− p)(1− 3p+ 3p2), (4)
γ1(ξ) =
µ3(ξ)
D(ξ)
3
2
=
E([ξ − E(ξ)]3)
D(ξ)
3
2
=
Ap −Aq
|Ap −Aq| ×
1− 2p√
p(1− p) , (5)
γ2(ξ) =
µ4(ξ)
D(ξ)2
− 3 = E([ξ − E(ξ)]
4)
D(ξ)2
− 3 = 1− 6p+ 6p
2
p(1− p) , (6)
H(ξ) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p). (7)
For Problem 3, in A A(A)p = 4, 000, A
(A)
q = 0, p(A) = 0.8, q(A) = 0.2, E(ξ(A)) =
3, 200, standard deviation
√
D(ξ(A)) = 1, 600, µ3(ξ(A)) = −6, 144, 000, 000,
µ4(ξ
(A)) = 21, 299, 200, 000, 000, γ1(ξ(A)) = − 32 , γ2(ξ(A)) = 14 , H(ξ(A)) ≈
0.721928, and in B A(B)p = 3, 000, A
(B)
q = 3, 000, p(B) = 1, q(B) = 0, E(ξ(B)) =
3, 000,
√
D(ξ(B)) = 0, µ3(ξ(B)) = 0, µ4(ξ(B)) = 0, γ1(ξ(B)) and γ2(ξ(B)) are
undefined, H(ξ(B)) = 0. Computing entropy, we follow [20, p. 5] and set
p log2(p) = 0 for p = 0. Undoubtedly, declining the greater E(ξ), voters choose
a greater award. The "paradox of irrationality" arises because in B the award
coincides with E(ξ(B)) = 3, 000 but in A it is not E(ξ(A)) = 3, 200. Indeed, in
A the award is random but the mathematical expectation is not. Already because
of this the award is not the mathematical expectation.
Sample Mean. In order to see better what the award in Prospect A is, the
author has "tortured" one of the human beings and formulated four variations
of Problem 3, where he might feel comfortable choosing A. A gambler may
1) play a fixed number of times known in advance, and get the mean;
2
2) play unlimitedly, choose the stopping time, and get the known mean;
3) play unlimitedly, choose the stopping time, and get the last known value;
4) gather any number of helpers; all choose A once; gains are summed; the
gambler gets the mean.
Each variation wastes gambler’s and helpers’ time, if all select B. For the author,
choosing A, each variation intensifies his feeling to gain more following to the
expectation and even more in the third variation. For him, to go or not to go
with the fixed positive mathematical expectation depends on how many times
N the game can be played and the cost of each game, if the expectation does
not include the latter. In [43], N is represented by the floor function of the
product of the playing frequency ν and time t: N = bν × tc. The sample mean
a1 depends on the numbers of outcomes Np and Nq in N = Np +Nq trials
a1 =
NpAp +NqAq
N
=
NpAp + (N −Np)Aq
N
=
Np(Ap −Aq)
bνtc +Aq. (8)
The a1 is random due to Np. If the fixed N ≥ 1 games represent independent
identically distributed, i.i.d., binary variables, then Np obeys a binomial distribu-
tion. In Prospect B of Problem 3, p(B) = 1, N (B)p = N = 1 make a
(B)
1 = 3, 000
a constant award. In Prospect A of Problem 3 and variations 1, 2, and 4, the
a
(A)
1 is a random award. One cares about all properties of the award but not only
one constant E(a1) = E(ξ), if those are responsible for getting nothing.
Variation 1 fixes N in advance. Variation 2 makes N random and dependent
on the observed a1. Variation 3 makes N random, values Np > 1 irrelevant,
and the award 4,000 likely. Variation 4 switches to the number of gamblers N .
For a fixed N ≥ 1, E(Np) = Np [12, p. 175] and
E(a1) = E
(
NpAp + (N −Np)Aq
N
)
= (Ap −Aq)p+Aq = E(ξ) = α1(ξ). (9)
D(a1) = E([a1 − E(a1)]2) = E(a21)− E2(a1) =
(Ap −Aq)2pq
N
=
D(ξ)
bνtc . (10)
The variance decreases with increasing N . This formula is in agreement with
the limit theorems [11] applicable to the mean sum of i.i.d. variables with
finite variance D(ξ) = (Ap−Aq)2pq in Bernoulli trials. An analytic method for
computing beginning moments αk of sums of i.i.d. random variables is suggested
in [35]. Then, the central moments µk can be expressed via αk = E(ξk) as
µk = E([ξ − E(ξ)]k) = E([ξ − α1]k) = E
j=k∑
j=0
k!
j!(k − j)!ξ
j(−α1)k−j
 =
=
j=k∑
j=0
k!
j!(k − j)! (−α1)
k−jE(ξj) =
j=k∑
j=0
k!
j!(k − j)! (−α1)
k−jαj .
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This yields the first four µk presented in [11, pp. 67 - 72]
µ0 = α0 = 1, µ1 = −α1 + α1 = 0, µ2 = α2 − α21,
µ3 = α3 − 3α1α2 + 2α31, µ4 = α4 − 4α1α3 + 6α21α2 − 3α41.
From Equations 8 and 9 µk(a1) = E([a1−E(a1)]k) = E([Ap−AqN ]k[Np−Np]k) =
(
Ap−Aq
N )
kE([Np −Np]k), where the second factor is the kth central moment of
a binomial distribution. Due to the factor (Ap−AqN )
k the third standardized mo-
ment γ1 depends on the sign −1, 0, 1 of the difference Ap−Aq but not individual
outcomes. The standardized moment γ2 does not dependent on the outcomes
at all. Formulas for the third and fourth beginning and central moments of a
binomial distribution are found in [26]. After accounting the first factor we get
µ3(a1) =
(Ap −Aq)3p(1− p)(1− 2p)
N2
=
µ3(ξ)
N2
=
µ3(ξ)
bνtc2 , (11)
µ4(a1) =
(Ap −Aq)4p(1− p)[1 + 3(N − 2)p(1− p)]
N3
, (12)
γ1(a1) =
Ap −Aq
|Ap −Aq| ×
1− 2p√
Np(1− p) =
γ1(ξ)√
N
=
γ1(ξ)√bνtc , (13)
γ2(a1) =
1− 6p+ 6p2
Np(1− p) =
γ2(ξ)
N
=
γ2(ξ)
bνtc . (14)
The sample mean, its variance, third and fourth central moments, skewness,
and excess kurtosis in Equations 8, 10 - 14 depend on time. In contrast, the
mean of sample mean in Equation 9 and its extreme values do not dependent on
time. Under other equal conditions, a big N achieved in a short time without
an extra cost makes a1 more symmetric, and certain for the author. It makes a1
less deviating from E(ξ) and "erases" a difference between them. In Problem 3,
N = 1 is the least. The frequency of games and playing time are important for
increasing confidence as long as they determine the actual number of games. In
lotteries, the ν and t can be compared with the life duration.
3 Mega Millions
Mathematical expectations are at the heart of lotteries. The history of the
Big Game began on August 31, 1996. In May 2002 the game was renamed to
Mega Millions. Since then, the rules have been changing. Currently, the initial
jackpot is $15 million. To win, one has to guess five of 75 numbers in the Game
field and one of 15 numbers in the Mega Ball field, Figure 1. A slip allows to
play up to five $1 games. If no tickets win the jackpot, then it grows. Table 1,
created using data of http://www.megamillions.com/history-of-the-game,
illustrates the jackpot history.
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Odds. Let F is the number of balls in a basket. There are f red and F − f
black balls. Ignoring the order, R balls are taken out without replacement with
equal chances. The probability to get r red balls among the selected is given by
the hypergeometric distribution [10, pp. 55 - 59]
p =
C(f, r)C(F − f,R− r)
C(F,R)
=
C(R, r)C(F −R, f − r)
C(F, f)
.
where C(N,n) = N !n!(N−n)! is the binomial coefficient. Here, r ≤ R and r ≤ f .
Table 1: History of Mega Millions Jackpot. Dates of drawings,
jackpot amounts in million U.S.A. dollars, and numbers of tickets
winning the jackpot.
Date Amount # Date Amount # Date Amount #
1/3/2014 61 1 3/5/2010 134 1 6/16/2006 35 1
12/17/2013 648∗ 2 1/29/2010 144 1 6/2/2006 47 1
10/1/2013 189 1 12/22/2009 165 1 5/16/2006 94 1
7/26/2013 19 1 11/10/2009 77 2 4/18/2006 265 1
7/16/2013 20 1 10/16/2009 200 1 2/28/2006 270 1
7/5/2013 80 1 9/1/2009 12 1 1/6/2006 15 1
5/31/2013 30 1 8/28/2009 336 2 12/30/2005 88 1
5/17/2013 198 2 7/7/2009 133 1 11/29/2005 35 2
3/12/2013 41 1 5/29/2009 35 1 11/15/2005 315 1
2/19/2013 26 1 5/15/2009 38 2 9/16/2005 258 1
2/5/2013 19 1 5/1/2009 227 3 7/22/2005 170 1
1/25/2013 89 1 3/13/2009 26 1 6/3/2005 106 1
12/14/2012 35 1 3/3/2009 216 1 4/22/2005 208 1
11/27/2012 50 1 1/13/2009 22 1 3/1/2005 115 1
11/2/2012 33 1 1/2/2009 47 1 1/18/2005 131 1
10/16/2012 61 2 12/12/2008 207 1 12/3/2004 25 1
9/18/2012 14 1 10/21/2008 42 1 11/19/2004 149 1
9/11/2012 120 1 10/3/2008 42 1 10/1/2004 106 1
7/27/2012 52 1 9/16/2008 15 1 8/20/2004 52 1
7/3/2012 85 1 9/9/2008 24 1 7/27/2004 10 1
5/29/2012 32 1 8/29/2008 133 1 7/23/2004 47 1
5/15/2012 25 1 7/22/2008 126 1 7/2/2004 294∗ 1
5/4/2012 118 1 6/13/2008 57 1 5/7/2004 67 1
3/30/2012 656∗ 3 5/23/2008 17 2 4/9/2004 109 1
1/24/2012 72 1 5/16/2008 196 1 3/2/2004 21 1
12/27/2011 208 1 4/1/2008 136 1 2/20/2004 239 1
11/1/2011 78 1 2/22/2008 275 1 12/30/2003 162 1
9/30/2011 113 2 1/1/2008 33 1 11/11/2003 70 3
8/19/2011 32 1 12/18/2007 163 2 10/7/2003 12 1
8/5/2011 99 1 11/2/2007 75 1 9/30/2003 150 1
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Date Amount # Date Amount # Date Amount #
7/1/2011 107 1 10/5/2007 27 1 8/8/2003 50 1
5/27/2011 35 1 9/25/2007 12 1 7/11/2003 34 1
5/13/2011 27 1 9/21/2007 61 1 6/20/2003 183 1
5/3/2011 51 1 8/31/2007 330 4 4/25/2003 46 1
4/15/2011 72 1 7/6/2007 128 1 3/28/2003 20 1
3/25/2011 319 1 5/29/2007 44 1 3/14/2003 43 1
2/1/2011 93 2 5/11/2007 113 1 2/18/2003 12 1
1/4/2011 380∗ 2 4/6/2007 105 1 2/11/2003 128 1
11/9/2010 25 1 3/6/2007 390∗ 2 12/24/2002 68 1
10/29/2010 141 1 1/9/2007 125 1 11/19/2002 16 1
9/17/2010 54 1 12/1/2006 40 1 11/8/2002 93 1
8/27/2010 135 1 11/14/2006 75 1 9/27/2002 37 1
7/16/2010 64 1 10/17/2006 55 1 9/6/2002 17 1
6/22/2010 26 1 9/26/2006 15 1 8/27/2002 108 1
6/11/2010 36 1 9/19/2006 12 1 7/16/2002 165 1
5/28/2010 12 1 9/15/2006 163 1 5/24/2002 12 1
5/25/2010 64 1 8/1/2006 31 1 5/17/2002 28 1
5/4/2010 266 1 7/18/2006 49 1
3/12/2010 20 1 6/27/2006 24 1
If there are two baskets represented by F1, f1, F1 − f1 and F2, f2, F2 − f2 and
R1 and R2 balls are taken out of each, then the probability to get r1 and r2 red
balls distinguished between baskets is the product p1p2. For m "independent"
baskets the reciprocal
∏i=m
i=1
1
pi
is equal to
Q =
i=m∏
i=1
C(Fi, Ri)
C(fi, ri)C(Fi − fi, Ri − ri) =
i=m∏
i=1
C(Fi, fi)
C(Ri, ri)C(Fi −Ri, fi − ri) .
For a particular case fi = Ri the formula
Q(r1, . . . , rm) =
i=m∏
i=1
C(Fi, fi)
C(fi, ri)C(Fi − fi, fi − ri) . (15)
describes reciprocal odds in the current Mega Millions and Power Ball lotteries.
The red and black balls are winning and losing numbers. The two baskets are
the Game and Mega Ball and Game and Powerball fields on slips. The word
field justifies the denominations Fi and fi.
For Mega Millions m = 2, F1 = 75, f1 = 5, F2 = 15, f2 = 1. The jackpot’s
Q(5, 1) = C(75,5)C(5,5)C(70,0)
C(15,1)
C(1,1)C(14,0) = 17259390×15 = 258890850. This coincides
with the entry in "How to Win Mega Millions", Figure 1. The values Q(5, 0) =
18492203.571, Q(4, 1) = 739688.143, Q(4, 0) = 52834.867, Q(3, 1) = 10720.118,
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Figure 1: The front (left) and back (right) sides of the Mega Millions with
Megaplier play slip in February 2014, Illinois, U.S.A.
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Q(3, 0) = 765.723, Q(2, 1) = 472.946, Q(1, 1) = 56.471, Q(0, 1) = 21.391 match
remaining entries. The sum of the nine reciprocals of Q is equal to 0.0679916034.
This is the probability of winning something per ticket with one chance in
14.707698.
Numbers of tickets. For drawing on January 31, 2014, 1,440,661 winning
tickets were announced. The jackpot was not won. If each ticket would be
equally probable, then their total number would be ≈ 1, 440, 661× 14.707698 =
21, 188, 807 including 21, 188, 807− 1, 440, 661 = 19, 748, 146 losing tickets.
Expectations. All awards except the effective jackpot J∗, the odds given by
Equation 15, and ticket price P = $1 are fixed. The mathematical expectation
of the profit and loss, P&L, of the game without Megaplier and tax is equal to
(see Figure 1)
E(P&L) =
J∗
Q(5, 1)
+
1, 000, 000
Q(5, 0)
+
5, 000
Q(4, 1)
+
500
Q(4, 0)
+
50
Q(3, 1)
+
5
Q(3, 0)
+
+
5
Q(2, 1)
+
2
Q(1, 1)
+
1
Q(0, 1)
− P = J
∗
258, 890, 850
− 0.82576841166846955.
The jackpot and large prizes $1,000,000 and $5,000 are taxable. With 40 percent
tax the last two numbers decrease to $600,000 and $3,000 yielding
E(P&L) =
J∗
258, 890, 850
− 0.85010299127991584.
It would be positive for $220, 083, 886 < J∗.
For Powerball m = 2, F1 = 59, f1 = 5, F2 = 35, f2 = 1, P = 2. Using
Equation 15 we get Q(5, 1) = 175223510, Q(5, 0) = 5153632.647, Q(4, 1) =
648975.963, Q(4, 0) = 19087.528, Q(3, 1) = 12244.829, Q(3, 0) = 360.142,
Q(2, 1) = 706.432, Q(1, 1) = 110.813, Q(0, 1) = 55.406. Figure of a Powerball
slip is omitted. The expectation without Powerplay and tax is
E(P&L) =
J∗
Q(5, 1)
+
1, 000, 000
Q(5, 0)
+
10, 000
Q(4, 1)
+
100
Q(4, 0)
+
100
Q(3, 1)
+
7
Q(3, 0)
+
+
7
Q(2, 1)
+
4
Q(1, 1)
+
4
Q(0, 1)
− 2 = J
∗
175, 223, 510
− 1.6395111592046067.
Decreasing $1,000,000 and $10,000 to $600,000 and $6,000 after 40% tax yields
E(P&L) =
J∗
175, 223, 510
− 1.7232898713192083.
It would be positive for $301, 960, 900 < J∗.
The effective jackpot J∗ should differ from the quoted J . The jackpot in
Table 1 assumes annuity payments. It has to be converted to a cash payout
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for declining annuity. The latter splits between all tickets winning jackpot and
should be adjusted. Finally, the adjusted cash payout is a subject for tax.
The first step based on the ordinary annuity formula [9, p. 13] yields J∗1
J∗1 =
years× rate
(1 + rate)years − 1J.
For 30 years and rates of 2, 3, or 5 percent, the coefficient in front of J is equal
to 0.7395, 0.6306, or 0.4515.
The second step has to take into consideration the number of purchased
tickets M . If each ticket wins jackpot equally likely with probability 1/Q(5, 1)
and they are filled independently, then the probability ofK winning coincidences
is binomial C(M,K)( 1Q(5,1) )
K(1− 1Q(5,1) )M−K . Each winner gets J
∗
1
K . ForK = 0
the payoff is zero. The mathematical expectation of the non-zero payoffs is
J∗1
M∑
K=1
C(M,K)
K
(
1
Q(5, 1)
)K (
1− 1
Q(5, 1)
)M−K
The probability that it is won is equal to
M∑
K=1
C(M,K)
(
1
Q(5, 1)
)K (
1− 1
Q(5, 1)
)M−K
= 1−
(
1− 1
Q(5, 1)
)M
For M equal to 10,000,000 and 100,000,000 it is 0.03788983372734210 and
0.3204083454349182. The weighted jackpot yielding the payoff expectation is
J∗2 =
∑M
K=1
C(M,K)
K
(
1
Q(5,1)
)K (
1− 1Q(5,1)
)M−K
1−
(
1− 1Q(5,1)
)M J∗1 = coeff(M)× J∗1 .
The third step is to apply the tax percent and get J∗ = (1− tax)× J∗2 . Finally,
the mathematical expectation in Mega Millions with tax = 0.4 is
E(P&L) =
0.6× years× rate×∑MK=1 C(M,K)K ( 1Q(5,1))K (1− 1Q(5,1))M−K
258, 890, 850× ((1 + rate)years − 1)×
(
1−
(
1− 1Q(5,1)
)M) J
− 0.85010299127991584.
(16)
Under other equal conditions E(P&L) is the function of the announced jackpot
J and the number of purchased tickets M , Figure 2. The former is known prior
a drawing. The latter can be estimated multiplying by three the difference
between the current and previous, if it was not won, cash jackpot amounts J∗1 .
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Figure 2: Mathematical expectation of Mega Millions lottery as a function
of the announced jackpot J and purchased number of tickets M , E(P&L) =
1.71× 10−9 × coeff2013(M)× J − 0.85, given by Equation 16 with years = 30
and rate = 0.02. Two projections a and b and the plane 0×M + 0× J help to
see better the range of parameters making the expectation positive. Plots are
done using Maple 10 from Maplesoft.
This assumes that one third of the collected money was used for increasing the
cash jackpot and the current number of tickets is not less.
With the initial jackpot $15,000,000 the mathematical expectation of profits
and losses in Mega Millions is negative. Equation 16 and Figure 2 indicate that
it can be positive, even, after declining the annuity option, splitting jackpot
between tickets winning it, and taxes. Since 2002 until 2005 it was needed to
guess 5 of 52 and 1 of 52 numbers. Since 2005 until 2013 - 5 of 56 and 1 of
46 numbers. The eight prizes after jackpot were $250,000, $10,000, $150, $150,
$7, $10, $3, and $2. Equations for the mathematical expectations of profit
and loss after 2002, 2005, and 2013 are 3.28× 10−9 × coeff2002(M)× J − 0.82,
2.53×10−9×coeff2005(M)×J−0.85, and 1.71×10−9×coeff2013(M)×J−0.85.
With coeff(M) = 0.9, the expectations are positive for J2002 > $278 million,
J2005 > $373 million, and J2013 > $552 million. Table 1 marks by stars five
such jackpot candidates occurred in 12 years. Let us assume that a gambler
decides to play only, when the expectation becomes positive. Does it mean that
the game under such a favorable condition is for certain?
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Game for Sure? Positive E(P&L) does not make the "favorable" drawings
a game for sure. During 80 years of an adult life a gambler may participate in
such infrequent events 80×512 ≈ 33 times. A gambler betting twice every week can
make 80 ∗ 52 ∗ 2 ≈ 8, 320 attempts. Both numbers are insignificant comparing
with the odds 1 : 258,890,850. The discrete nature of gains and losses implies
either a chain of -$1 (ignore smaller prizes) or one win making previous losses
unimportant. There are no drawings returning the favorable expected values
counted by a few dozen of cents. The potential extreme gain and actual low cost
are more important than the mathematical expectation for a decision to play.
Let one in a favorable case with $552,000,000 jackpot agrees to get annuity,
pays for the tickets $258,890,850, and technically fills them by unique combin-
ations of numbers. This ensures winning the jackpot. We have seen that the
probability of multiple wins of the jackpot does not reduce much the mean num-
ber of winning tickets. The coefficient 0.8 - 0.9 increases 1 to 1.1 − 1.25. Tax
40% takes more. But this is the mean number of winning tickets. In reality
it is either 1, 2, or 3 ... While the tax is fixed (not for annuity payments),
the number of winning tickets is random. Just only two else claim a winning
ticket, the favorable attempt becomes a financial disaster because of the sharing.
Again, not only the mathematical expectation of the number of winning tickets
but a probability that the actual number will deviate from it look important.
4 Problem 3’ from Kahneman and Tversky
Problem 3 was changed to 3’ [15, 268]. Now, Prospect A’ is losing 4,000 with the
probability 0.8 and Prospect B’ is losing 3,000 for sure. In A’ the mathematical
expectation 0.2×0+0.8×−4, 000 = −3, 200 is less than in B’ -3,000. However, 92
percent of 95 respondents choose A’. Kahneman and Tversky label this pattern,
switching the signs of outcomes, the reflection effect. Respondents attempt to
avoid a loss with the small probability 0.2. Again, the author "feels" that losing
the sample mean a1 =
N2×(−4,000)
N characterized by the standard deviation√
D(a1) =
√
(−4,000)2×0.8×0.2
N =
1,600√
N
in a big guaranteed number of games
N = bν × tc without extra cost makes A’ worse than B’.
Properties of variables for Problem 3’ are A(A
′)
p = 0, A
(A′)
q = −4, 000, p(A′) =
0.2, q(A
′) = 0.8, E(ξ(A
′)) = −3, 200, standard deviation
√
D(ξ(A′)) = 1, 600,
µ3(ξ
(A′)) = 6, 144, 000, 000, µ4(ξ(A
′)) = 21, 299, 200, 000, 000, γ1(ξ(A
′)) = 32 ,
γ2(ξ
(A′)) = 14 , H(ξ
(A′)) ≈ 0.721928, and A(B′)p = −3, 000, A(B
′)
q = −3, 000,
p(B
′) = 1, q(B
′) = 0, E(ξ(B
′)) = −3, 000,
√
D(ξ(B′)) = 0, µ3(ξ(B
′)) = 0,
µ4(ξ
(B′)) = 0, γ1(ξ(B
′)) and γ2(ξ(B
′)) are undefined, H(ξ(B
′)) = 0. Mathem-
atical expectations, third central moments, skewness of the random variables
in Problems 3A and 3’A are equal by absolute value and have opposite sign.
Mathematical expectations of the deterministic variables in Problems 3B and
3’B are equal by absolute value and have opposite sign.
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5 Livermore about the hope and fear
The author has "discovered" [42, p. 5] that the legendary speculator Jesse
Livermore [28], [27], [48], [47] guessed the certainty and reflection effects [15].
Indeed, [28, pp. 11 - 12]: "... You buy a stock at $30.00. The next day it
has a quick run-up to $32.00 or $32.50. You immediately become fearful that if
you don’t take the profit, the next day you may see it fade away - so out you go
with a small profit, when that is very time you should entertain all the hope in
the world." This is a certainty effect.
Further, [28, pp. 12 - 13]: "On the other hand, suppose you buy a stock at
$30.00, and the next day it goes to $28.00, showing a two-point loss. You would
not be fearful that the next day would possibly see a three-point loss or more.
No, you would regard it merely as a temporary reaction, feeling certain that the
next day it would recover its loss. ... That is when you should be fearful, because
if you do not get out, you might be forced to take a much greater loss later on."
This is a reflection effect.
Livermore believes that a human being "injects a hope and fear into the
business of speculation" and "is apt to get the two confused and in reverse
positions". His 40 years trading wisdom is [28, p. 13] "Profits always take
care of themselves, but losses never do". His intuition was trained by winning
and losing several fortunes. He played the game many times feeling but not
measuring the odds behind his advices. Empirical distributions of prices, their
increments, and waiting times between transactions vary [42]. This strengthens
uncertainty of profits and losses presenting a trading opportunity as the last
one. Under such conditions following his advices is difficult psychologically and
increasing N = bν × tc does not guarantee a fast convergence of a1.
6 The St. Petersburg paradox
The author considered random sample means as universal awards in Prospects
and the St. Petersburg game independently on Khinchin [18] and only after
that found his "forgotten" paper [43]. Khinchin concentrates on mathematical
properties of random geometric and arithmetic means, which can explain the
"paradox". He reviews psychology [18, p. 330], [43, p. 7]):
"Let us notice only that in this case, of course, no speech may go about any
mathematical paradox but at most about that the mathematical expectation is
not always adequate to those worldly-psychological representations, which it is
commonly connected to. In the case of the Petersburg game, it is often pointed
to that Petr in his expectation of winning, naturally, orients not on the mathem-
atical expectation of winning in a particular game, which is difficult to account
psychologically, but on some average winning during big number of games. Such
understanding of psychological prerequisites of the "paradox" puts in front of us
a certain mathematical task, which can be formulated as follows: Find such an
estimate of the mean winning of Petr during a big number of games, that its
probability would go to unit with infinite increasing the number of games. How-
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ever, it makes sense to say, that the task will get a quite determined sense only
after a certain notion of the mean winning will be exactly defined. In the current
note, we shall consider in details the set problem in two of the most simple (and
also the most important) cases, namely in assumption that the mean winning is
defined as the geometric and arithmetic mean of particular games".
Khinchin is indifferent, if N is achievable. If "yes", then his two theorems
work. For the author, the sample mean a1 is an award in Prospects with N = 1.
The case N = bν × tc is generic. The a1 is a universal random award in the St.
Petersburg game, Prospects, and variations 1, 2, and 4. For N = 1 it coincides
with underlying random variables.
In a private conversation with Timur Misirpashaev the author discussed
credit nuances of the St. Petersburg game and believes that the topic "correl-
ates" with Samuelson’s bankruptcy consideration [45] and the following Buffon’s
comment [6, p. 82]: "... All money on the Earth is not enough to accomplish this
[VS: to pay the win], if the game stops on 40th trial, because it will require 1024
times more money than there exists in the entire kingdom of France". During
the discussion, the author has proposed to pay $3 for the right to play one time
and $18 to play 10 times, under a condition that in both cases the third party
reserves the deposit $128 to pay a win, if such will be drawn. This proposal was
done after experimenting with the C++ program khinchin.cpp [43, Appendix].
Making decisions for the four variations and Prospects depends on probab-
ilistic properties of a1. The St. Petersburg game adds the credit uncertainty of
paying the win. The creditworthiness is not in scope of this article.
7 Prokhorov’s estimates
If one choses between random variables aA1 and aB1 , then a measure affecting
the decision should account their properties. The sums and mean sums of i.i.d.
variables obey the Laplace theorem, the law of big numbers, and the law of the
iterated logarithm [19], [22], [11], [23], [37], [12]. Yurii Vasilevich Prokhorov
presents estimates for the law of big numbers [37, p. 281]
∀ > 0, η > 0, P{|µn
n
− p| ≤ } > 1− η, if n ≥ n0 > 1 + 
2
log
1
η
+
1

, (17)
where µn is the number of successes in n Bernoulli (p, 1 − p) trials and P is
the probability of inequality. Figure 3 plots decimal logarithm of the right
expression. In Problem 3, aB1 = E(aB1 ) = E(ξB) = 3, 000 is constant and aA1
is random with N = 1. In variations 1, 2, and 4 with increasing N , aA1 →
E(aA1 ) = E(ξ
A) = 3, 200. If aA1 does not drop below aB1 = 3, 000, then it
becomes attractive. Such a drop occurs, if µnn ≤ A
B
1
AA1
= 3,0004,000 =
3
4 . Thus, the
threshold value is  = | 34 − 45 | = 120 = 0.05 and N > 420 log 1η + 20. For η = 0.01
and η = 0.001, we get P > 0.99 and P > 0.999, if N > 1, 955 and N > 2, 922.
It is assumed that N = bν × tc games can be played and there is no additional
cost comparing with playing one game.
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Figure 3: 3D dependence of decimal logarithm of the rightmost expression of
Inequality 17 on η and  and two projections. Plots are done using Maple 10
from Maplesoft
8 Entropy of Sample Mean
In probability theory, a full system of events A1, A2, ..., An is a group of events,
where in each trial one and only one of them comes. The events, specified
together with their probabilities p1, p2, ..., pn (pk ≥ 0,
∑k=n
k=1 pk = 1), are
named in [20] a finite schema(
A1 A2 ... An
p1 p2 ... pn
)
.
The Shannon’s entropy of the finite schema is the function
H(p1, p2, ..., pn) = −
k=n∑
k=1
pk log2(pk),
where pk log2(pk) = 0 for pk = 0. It is a reasonable measure of uncertainty of
the finite schema. For a two-point random variable we get H from Equation 7.
For two independent finite scheme(
A1 A2 ... An
p1 p2 ... pn
)
,
(
B1 B2 ... Bm
q1 q2 ... qm
)
the probability pikl of the joint events Ak and Al is equal to pkql (1 ≤ k ≤ n,
1 ≤ l ≤ m). The set of the joint events AkBl form a new schema AB - the union
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of scheme A and B. In this case, H(AB) = H(A) + H(B). If for two scheme,
representing two i.i.d. two-point variables, the four events (Ap, Ap), (Ap, Aq),
(Aq, Ap), (Aq, Aq) are distinguished, then the entropy is equal to
−p2 log2(p2)− p(1− p) log2(p(1− p))− (1− p)p log2((1− p)p)−
(1− p)2 log2((1− p)2) = 2(−p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p)) = 2H.
For the sum of N i.i.d. two-point variables, where 2N events are distinguished,
the entropy grows linearly with N and is equal to N ×H.
However, from profit or loss point of view, the events (Ap, Aq) and (Aq, Ap)
are identical yielding the schema for sample mean money outcomes(
Ap Ap +Aq Aq
p2 2p(1− p) (1− p)2
)
.
Its entropy is less than or equal to 2H
−p2 log2(p2)−2p(1−p) log2(2p(1−p))− (1−p)2 log2((1−p)2) = 2H+2p2−2p,
because p2 − p ≤ 0. From Equation 8, for N ≥ 1 we deal with a binomial
distribution of N + 1 outcomes. The schema for the sum of N terms is(
NAq (N − 1)Aq +Ap ... NAq + (Ap −Aq)Np ... NAp
(1− p)N Np(1− p)N−1 ... N !Np!(N−Np)!pNp(1− p)N−Np ... pN
)
.
The schema for the mean sum of N terms is(
Aq
(N−1)Aq+Ap
N ... Aq + (Ap −Aq)NpN ... Ap
(1− p)N Np(1− p)N−1 ... N !Np!(N−Np)!pNp(1− p)N−Np ... pN
)
.
For both scheme, where random Np = 0, 1, . . . , N ,
H(p,N) = −
Np=N∑
Np=0
N !
Np!(N −Np)!p
Np(1−p)N−Np log2
(
N !
Np!(N −Np)!p
Np(1− p)N−Np
)
.
H(p,N) is positive for 0 < p < 1 and 1 ≤ N . The random sum ξsum and
sample mean a1 are linear functions of the binomial random variable Np: ξsum =
slopesum ×Np + interceptsum = (Ap −Aq)Np +Aq and a1 = Ap−AqN Np +Aq.
Let us notice, that for a normal distribution with mean α1 and variance µ2
the differential (or continuous) entropy is equal to
H(α1, µ2) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piµ2
e−
(x−α1)2
2µ2 log2
(
1√
2piµ2
e−
(x−α1)2
2µ2
)
dx =
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piµ2
e−
(x−α1)2
2µ2
[
log2(
1√
2piµ2
)− (x− α1)
2
2µ2
log2(e)
]
dx =
log2(
√
2piµ2) +
log2(e)
2
=
log2(2pieµ2)
2
.
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H(α1, µ2) does not depend on α1 and can be negative for tiny variance µ2. From
limit theorems, for N →∞ binomial distribution approaches normal with mean
Np and variance Np(1− p). There is temptation to approximate the binomial
entropy by log2(2pieNp(1−p))2 , which tends to infinity for 0 < p < 1 and N →∞.
Similarly, a sample mean distribution approaches normal with mean (Ap−Aq)p+
Aq and variance
(Ap−Aq)2p(1−p)
N . However, substituting variance into the normal
distribution entropy expression yields log2(2pie(Ap−Aq)
2p(1−p)))
2 − log2(N)2 , which
becomes negative for N ≥ 2pie(Ap − Aq)2p(1 − p). This contradicts to non-
negative value H(p,N) and emphasizes the difference between discrete and dif-
ferential entropy. Let us denote binomial probability PNp =
N !
Np!(N−Np)!p
Np(1−
p)N−Np and recollect that
∑Np=N
Np=0
PNp = 1,
∑Np=N
Np=0
NpPNp = Np, P0 =
(1− p)N , P1 = Np(1− p)N−1, PN−1 = NpN−1(1− p), and PN = pN . Then,
H(p,N) = −
Np=N∑
Np=0
PNp log2(PNp) = −
Np=N∑
Np=0
PNp log2
(
N !
Np!(N −Np)!
)
−
Np=N∑
Np=0
PNpNp log2(p)−
Np=N∑
Np=0
PNp(N −Np) log2(1− p) =
−
Np=N∑
Np=0
PNp log2
(
N !
Np!(N −Np)!
)
−Np log2(p)−N(1− p) log2(1− p) =
N ×H −
Np=N∑
Np=0
PNp log2
(
N !
Np!(N −Np)!
)
.
Since 1 ≤ N !Np!(N−Np)! , H(p,N) ≤ N ×H. Next,
Np=N∑
Np=0
PNp log2
(
N !
Np!(N −Np)!
)
= (P1 + PN−1) log2(N)+
Np=N−2∑
Np=2
PNp(log2(N !)− log2(Np!)− log2((N −Np)!)) ≈ (P1 + PN−1) log2(N)+
Np=N−2∑
Np=2
PNp((N +
1
2
) log2(N)− (Np +
1
2
) log2(Np)− (N −Np +
1
2
) log2(N −Np))−
1
2
log2(2pi)(1− P0 − P1 − PN−1 − PN ) = (P1 + PN−1) log2(N)+
((N +
1
2
) log2(N)−
1
2
log2(2pi))(1− P0 − P1 − PN−1 − PN )−
Np=N−2∑
Np=2
PNp((Np +
1
2
) log2(Np) + (N −Np +
1
2
) log2(N −Np)).
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The Stirling’s approximation ln(n!) ≈ n ln(n)−n+ 12 ln(2pin) = (n+ 12 ) ln(ne ) +
1
2 ln(2pie) and log2(n!) ≈ (n+ 12 ) log2(ne )+ 12 log2(2pie) has been applied. We get
H(p,N) ≈ NH − (P1 + PN−1) log2(N)−
((N +
1
2
) log2(N)−
1
2
log2(2pi))(1− P0 − P1 − PN−1 − PN )+
Np=N−2∑
Np=2
PNp((Np +
1
2
) log2(Np) + (N −Np +
1
2
) log2(N −Np)),
where evaluation of large factorials is avoided. While the number of outcomes
N + 1 increases linearly with N , the change of corresponding binomial prob-
abilities causes non-linear and slow growth of H(p,N). The role of time here
is in N = bνtc. The H(p,N) is common for the sample sum and mean sum.
The range of the former [NAq, NAp] is getting wider. The range of the lat-
ter [Aq, Ap] remains intact with uniform increasing density of outcomes. The
common for both sums discrete entropy, being a function of only probabilities,
does not reflect these nuances. Increasing the discrete Shannon’s entropy widely
associated with uncertainty does not tell that the mean sum gets lower variance.
However, it is the latter decreasing parameter causes author’s impression that
certainty of an award increases.
Discrete vs. differential entropy. In contrast with discrete entropy of a
binomial distribution, the differential entropy of a normal one, approached by
both sums for N → ∞, better corresponds to a common point of view that
a higher entropy associates with higher uncertainty. This happens because the
expression for H(α1, µ2) contains µ2 under logarithm. For the sample mean sum
the entropy at the Gaussian limit grows by absolute value but with negative sign
- decreases. The negative sign creates inconvenience. Accordingly, we shall use
entropy for studying fractions of responds carefully and restrictedly.
9 Fractions of respondents
Let there exists a function that maps a random prospect to deterministic money.
If prospects and equivalents could be exchanged at any time without cost, then
respondents choosing between two prospects, would rationally select the greater
value. The fractions would be zero and one and for equal values any. Divergence
of opinion means that the function that eliminates uncertainty was unknown.
In contrast, a risk neutral portfolio of a stock and call options on it illustrates
a possibility to eliminate randomness [5]. We shall look for a different function
that maps properties of random prospects to fractions of respondents, which can
be verified using questionnaires like in [15] and [51].
Selecting a profit opportunity in Problem 3, majority excludes a chance
to get nothing. Choosing between losing scenarios in Problem 3’, respondents
want to avoid a loss completely. If in Prospects 3B and 3A the sure, p = 1, and
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uncertain, p = 0.8, gains would be 1 but not 3,000 and a Mega Millions jackpot
but not 4,000, then the author would favor 3A. Set the uncertain, q = 0.8,
loss in Prospect 3’A substantially greater by absolute value than -4,000 (home,
Mega Millions jackpot, ... life) and 3’B with the sure, -3,000, loss looks as the
lesser of evils. The fractions of voters depend on known properties of awards or
losses and poorly known nature of human beings. Can fractions of respondents
be derived from properties of prospects?
Several prospects [15], [51] are based on two outcomes Ap and Aq and cor-
responding probabilities p and q = 1− p. These are two-point variables, which
the author considers as random sample means a1, mean sums of the random
i.i.d. two-point variables, where the number of summands N = 1. This gener-
alization includes cases with N = bν × tc > 1. The four independent quantities
{Ap, Aq, p,N} fully characterize a1. Without losing generality Aq ≤ Ap.
Prospect 3B is the deterministic award a1 with {Ap = 3, 000, Aq = 3, 000, p =
1, N = 1}. Prospect 3A is the random award a1 with {Ap = 4, 000, Aq = 0, p =
0.8, N = 1}. Prospect 3’B is the deterministic loss with {Ap = −3, 000, Aq =
−3, 000, p = 1, N = 1}. Prospect 3’A is the random loss with {Ap = 0, Aq =
−4, 000, p = 0.2, N = 1}. The two-point variable is deterministic, if Ap = Aq
and/or p = 0 or 1. Empirical fractions of respondents choosing between a(1)1 and
a
(2)
1 summing to 1 = F
(1) + F (2) should be approximated by model functions
f (1) = f (1)(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) = f
(1)({A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}, {A(2)p , A(2)q , p(2), N (2)}) and
f (2) = 1 − f (1). Ideal is a single function f(a(1)1 , a(2)1 ) returning a fraction of
respondents depending on the order of arguments. Then, 0 ≤ f(x, y) ≤ 1 is a
solution of the functional equation f(x, y) + f(y, x) = 1
f({A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}, {A(2)p , A(2)q , p(2), N (2)})+
+f({A(2)p , A(2)q , p(2), N (2)}, {A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}) = 1.
(18)
10 Predictable properties of f (1) and f (2)
For some arguments, fractions of respondents make rational sense. Each discrete
random variable with finite number of finite outcomes has a minimum and
maximum value. Intervals determined by the extreme values of two variables
can be disjoined, adjacent, or overlapping. An interval and variable is a point
and constant, if Amin = Amax. The symbols A
(1)
min, A
(1)
max, A
(2)
min, A
(2)
max form
4! = 24 permutations. Each has three places to be filled by = or < like A(1)min =
A
(1)
max < A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max. This yields eight variations for each permutation and
creates 24× 8 = 192 combinations.
Canonical Combinations. Some combinations are equivalent: A(1)min = A
(1)
max <
A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max and A
(1)
max = A
(1)
min < A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max. Symbols, connected by
equality signs, were sorted in the order A(1)min < A
(1)
max < A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max. This
translates A(1)max = A
(1)
min < A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max to A
(1)
min = A
(1)
max < A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max and
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A
(1)
max = A
(2)
min = A
(1)
min < A
(2)
max to A
(1)
min = A
(1)
max = A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max. The images
were named canonical combinations and only one repetition was selected. The
author has written a C++ program and found 75 unique canonical combina-
tions with 26 satisfying numerical conventions A(1)min ≤ A(1)max and A(2)min ≤ A(2)max,
Table 2.
In 1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 18, 25, 26 the worst outcome of one prospect is better than
the best outcome of another. This advantage depends on neither probabilities
nor positive numbers of trials. Rational respondents will predictably chose a
prospect with greater outcomes, if the intervals are disjoined.
In 3, 4, 11, 16, 23, 24 one prospect is not worse than another and the
fractions of respondents are either 1 or 0. For these combinations the fractions
can be undefined ↑, if probabilities make both variables equal constants. In
A
(1)
q = A
(1)
p = A
(2)
q < A
(2)
p a two-point prospect (2) is better than (1), if
p(2) > 0, and undefined otherwise. The fractions 0, 1, ↑ for adjacent intervals
are predictable.
In 12 both prospects are equal constants: fractions are predictably undefined.
In 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22 the intervals overlap and fractions are
not obvious.
If the intervals of two variables determined by the maximum and minimum
outcomes are disjoined, then the fractions of respondents are deduced from a
common rational sense, where probabilities and positive numbers of trials are
irrelevant for a decision making. If the intervals are adjacent, then the fractions
are deduced from rational sense or undefined for equal deterministic variables.
If the intervals overlap, then probabilities and numbers of trials matter.
Table 2: Canonical combinations, f (1), f (2) for N (1) > 0, N (2) > 0.
# Condition f (1) f (2) Comment
1 A(1)min < A
(1)
max < A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max 0 1 (1) < (2)
2 A(1)min < A
(1)
max < A
(2)
min = A
(2)
max 0 1 (1) < (2); constant a
(2)
1
3 A(1)min < A
(1)
max = A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max 0∨ ↑ 1∨ ↑ (1) ≤ (2); adjacent
4 A(1)min < A
(1)
max = A
(2)
min = A
(2)
max 0∨ ↑ 1∨ ↑ (1) ≤ (2); constant a(2)1 ; adjacent
5 A(1)min < A
(2)
min < A
(1)
max < A
(2)
max ? ? overlapping
6 A(1)min < A
(2)
min < A
(1)
max = A
(2)
max ? ? overlapping
7 A(1)min < A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max < A
(1)
max ? ? overlapping
8 A(1)min < A
(2)
min = A
(2)
max < A
(1)
max ? ? constant a
(2)
1 ; overlapping
9 A(1)min = A
(1)
max < A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max 0 1 (1) < (2); constant a
(1)
1
10 A(1)min = A
(1)
max < A
(2)
min = A
(2)
max 0 1 (1) < (2); constant a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1
11 A(1)min = A
(1)
max = A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max 0∨ ↑ 1∨ ↑ (1) ≤ (2); constant a(1)1 ; adjacent
12 A(1)min = A
(1)
max = A
(2)
min = A
(2)
max ↑ ↑ constant a(1)1 = a(2)1
13 A(1)min = A
(2)
min < A
(1)
max < A
(2)
max ? ? overlapping
14 A(1)min = A
(2)
min < A
(1)
max = A
(2)
max ? ? overlapping
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
# Condition f (1) f (2) Comment
15 A(1)min = A
(2)
min < A
(2)
max < A
(1)
max ? ? overlapping
16 A(1)min = A
(2)
min = A
(2)
max < A
(1)
max 1∨ ↑ 0∨ ↑ (2) ≤ (1); constant a(2)1 ; adjacent
17 A(2)min < A
(2)
max < A
(1)
min < A
(1)
max 1 0 (2) < (1)
18 A(2)min < A
(2)
max < A
(1)
min = A
(1)
max 1 0 (2) < (1); constant a
(1)
1
19 A(2)min < A
(1)
min < A
(1)
max < A
(2)
max ? ? overlapping
20 A(2)min < A
(1)
min < A
(1)
max = A
(2)
max ? ? overlapping
21 A(2)min < A
(1)
min < A
(2)
max < A
(1)
max ? ? overlapping
22 A(2)min < A
(1)
min = A
(1)
max < A
(2)
max ? ? constant a
(1)
1 ; overlapping
23 A(2)min < A
(1)
min = A
(1)
max = A
(2)
max 1∨ ↑ 0∨ ↑ (2) ≤ (1); constant a(1)1 ; adjacent
24 A(2)min < A
(1)
min = A
(2)
max < A
(1)
max 1∨ ↑ 0∨ ↑ (2) ≤ (1); adjacent
25 A(2)min = A
(2)
max < A
(1)
min < A
(1)
max 1 0 (2) < (1); constant a
(2)
1
26 A(2)min = A
(2)
max < A
(1)
min = A
(1)
max 1 0 (2) < (1); constant a
(2)
1 < a
(1)
1
Swapping indexes 1 and 2 does not change validity of a canonical combination
and may require conventional sorting. Following Equation 18 this swaps values
of fractions of respondents. Swapping transforms 1 ↔ 17, 2 ↔ 18, 3 ↔ 24,
4↔ 23, 5↔ 21, 6↔ 20, 7↔ 19, 8↔ 22, 9↔ 25, 10↔ 26, 11↔ 16, 13↔ 15.
Due to sorting 12 ↔ 12, and 14 ↔ 14. 12 and 14 represent identical intervals,
where 12 is a point. Due to the symmetry we have to find f(a(1)1 , a
(2)
1 ) only for
1 - 14. The cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12 are either predictable or undefined,
axiomatic. The cases 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14 require attention.
For two-point variables, A(1)min = A
(1)
q ≤ A(1)max = A(1)p and A(2)min = A(2)q ≤
A
(2)
max = A
(2)
p . Probabilities p(1) and p(2) are independent. Their combinations
are in Table 3. A variable is constant, if p = 1 or 0. If both variables are constant
because of probabilities and/or equal outcomes, then the choice is predictable.
Table 3: Combinations of probabilities of two-point distributions.
# Condition Comment
1 p(1) = 0, p(2) = 0 constant a(1)1 = A
(1)
q , a
(2)
1 = A
(2)
q , H(a
(1)
1 ) = H(a
(2)
1 ) = 0
2 p(1) = 0 < p(2) < 1 constant a(1)1 = A
(1)
q , H(a
(1)
1 ) = 0
3 p(1) = 0, p(2) = 1 constant a(1)1 = A
(1)
q , a
(2)
1 = A
(2)
p , H(a
(1)
1 ) = H(a
(2)
1 ) = 0
4 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 0 constant a(2)1 = A
(2)
q , H(a
(2)
1 ) = 0
5 0 < p(1) = p(2) = p < 1 H(ξ1) = H(ξ2) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p)
6 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 1 constant a(2)1 = A
(2)
p , H(a
(2)
1 ) = 0
7 p(1) = 1, p(2) = 0 constant a(1)1 = A
(1)
p , a
(2)
1 = A
(2)
q , H(a
(1)
1 ) = H(a
(2)
1 ) = 0
Continued on next page
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# Condition Comment
8 p(1) = 1, 0 < p(2) < 1 constant a(1)1 = A
(1)
p , H(a
(1)
1 ) = 0
9 p(1) = 1, p(2) = 1 constant a(1)1 = A
(1)
p , a
(2)
1 = A
(2)
p , H(a
(1)
1 ) = H(a
(2)
1 ) = 0
10 0 < p(1) < p(2) < 1
11 0 < p(2) < p(1) < 1
Combinations 1, 3, 7, 9 from Table 3 make both prospects deterministic. Com-
binations 2, 4, 6, 8 make one prospect deterministic. The alternative pro-
spect can become deterministic due to outcomes. Example is A(1)min < A
(2)
min =
A
(2)
max < A
(1)
max, Table 2(8), combined with p(1) = 0 < p(2) < 1, Table 3(2):
Prospect (2) is constant because a(2)1 = A
(2)
min = A
(2)
max = A
(2)
q = A
(2)
p and Pro-
spect (1) is constant because p(1) = 0 and a(1)1 = A
(1)
min = A
(1)
q . This is true
∀ 0 < N (1), 0 < N (2). Therefore, f (1) = 0, f (2) = 1.
Cartesian product Table 2(5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14) × Table 3(2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11)
= 42 requires further attention, Table 4.
Table 4: Cartesian product of selective conditions for outcomes
A
(1)
min = A
(1)
q , A
(1)
max = A
(1)
p , A
(2)
min = A
(2)
q , A
(2)
max = A
(2)
p , Table 2,
and probabilities, Table 3, and f (1), f (2) for N (1) > 0, N (2) > 0.
# 2 Condition 3 Condition f (1) f (2) Comment
1 5 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 2 p(1) = 0 < p(2) < 1 0 1 (1) < (2)
2 5 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 4 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 0 ? ?
3 5 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 5 0 < p(1) = p(2) = p < 1 0 1
4 5 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 6 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 1 0 1 (1) < (2)
5 5 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 8 p(1) = 1, 0 < p(2) < 1 ? ?
6 5 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 10 0 < p(1) < p(2) < 1 ? ?
7 5 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 11 0 < p(2) < p(1) < 1 ? ?
8 6 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 2 p(1) = 0 < p(2) < 1 0 1 (1) < (2)
9 6 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 4 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 0 ? ?
10 6 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 5 0 < p(1) = p(2) = p < 1 0 1
11 6 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 6 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 1 0 1 (1) ≤ (2)
12 6 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 8 p(1) = 1, 0 < p(2) < 1 1 0 (2) ≤ (1)
13 6 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 10 0 < p(1) < p(2) < 1 0 1
14 6 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 11 0 < p(2) < p(1) < 1 ? ?
15 7 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 2 p(1) = 0 < p(2) < 1 0 1 (1) < (2)
16 7 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 4 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 0 ? ?
Continued on next page
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# 2 Condition 3 Condition f (1) f (2) Comment
17 7 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 5 0 < p(1) = p(2) = p < 1 ? ?
18 7 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 6 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 1 ? ?
19 7 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 8 p(1) = 1, 0 < p(2) < 1 1 0 (2) < (1)
20 7 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 10 0 < p(1) < p(2) < 1 ? ?
21 7 A(1)q < A
(2)
q < A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 11 0 < p(2) < p(1) < 1 ? ?
22 8 A(1)q < A
(2)
q = A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 2 p(1) = 0 < p(2) < 1 0 1 (1) < (2)
23 8 A(1)q < A
(2)
q = A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 4 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 0 ? ?
24 8 A(1)q < A
(2)
q = A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 5 0 < p(1) = p(2) = p < 1 ? ?
25 8 A(1)q < A
(2)
q = A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 6 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 1 ? ?
26 8 A(1)q < A
(2)
q = A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 8 p(1) = 1, 0 < p(2) < 1 1 0 (2) < (1)
27 8 A(1)q < A
(2)
q = A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 10 0 < p(1) < p(2) < 1 ? ?
28 8 A(1)q < A
(2)
q = A
(2)
p < A
(1)
p 11 0 < p(2) < p(1) < 1 ? ?
29 13 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 2 p(1) = 0 < p(2) < 1 0 1 (1) ≤ (2)
30 13 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 4 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 0 1 0 (2) ≤ (1)
31 13 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 5 0 < p(1) = p(2) = p < 1 0 1 (1) ≤ (2)
32 13 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 6 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 1 0 1 (1) < (2)
33 13 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 8 p(1) = 1, 0 < p(2) < 1 ? ?
34 13 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 10 0 < p(1) < p(2) < 1 0 1
35 13 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p < A
(2)
p 11 0 < p(2) < p(1) < 1 ? ?
36 14 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 2 p(1) = 0 < p(2) < 1 0 1 (1) ≤ (2)
37 14 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 4 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 0 1 0 (2) ≤ (1)
38 14 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 5 0 < p(1) = p(2) = p < 1 ↑ ↑ (1) = (2)
39 14 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 6 0 < p(1) < 1, p(2) = 1 0 1 (1) ≤ (2)
40 14 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 8 p(1) = 1, 0 < p(2) < 1 1 0 (2) ≤ (1)
41 14 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 10 0 < p(1) < p(2) < 1 0 1
42 14 A(1)q = A
(2)
q < A
(1)
p = A
(2)
p 11 0 < p(2) < p(1) < 1 1 0
If arbitrary large number of trials costs nothing and possible, then due to
decreasing variance of a1 following from Equation 10 the author thinks that
if A(1)p p
(1) +A(1)q q
(1) > A(2)p p
(2) +A(2)q q
(2), N (1) →∞, N (2) →∞, then
f({A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}, {A(2)p , A(2)q , p(2), N (2)})→ 1,
(19)
if A(1)p p
(1) +A(1)q q
(1) < A(2)p p
(2) +A(2)q q
(2), N (1) →∞, N (2) →∞, then
f({A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}, {A(2)p , A(2)q , p(2), N (2)})→ 0,
(20)
if A(1)p p
(1) +A(1)q q
(1) = A(2)p p
(2) +A(2)q q
(2), N (1) →∞, N (2) →∞, then
f({A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}, {A(2)p , A(2)q , p(2), N (2)})→ undefined.
(21)
22
Figure 4: A 3D projection of predictable (axiomatic) properties of f (1) together
with blue diamonds, the experimental points 2, 10, 12, and 14 from Table 5.
Green lines and surface correspond to the postulates. Red points indicate am-
biguity. A(1)q = A
(2)
q = 0.
The author believes that respondents unanimously select the sure 3,000.01
instead of 3,000.00 and -4,000.00 instead of -4,000.01. For equal sure amounts
the choice is undefined. These are the combinations Table 2(3) + Table 3(7),
2(4) + 3(7, 8, or 9), 2(6) + 3(9), 2(11) + 3(1, 4, or 7), 2(12) + 3(any), 2(13)
+ 3(1), 2(14) + 3(1, or 9), 2(15) + 3(1), 2(16) + 3(1, 2, or 3), 2(20) + 3(9),
2(23) + 3(3, 6, or 9), 2(24) + 3(3). In general, 0, 1, and ↑ postulated for f (1)
and/or f (2) in Tables 2 and 4 indicate combinations of arguments and values,
which, together with Equations 19 - 21, are candidates to axioms. Kahneman
and Tversky present experimental F (1) and F (2) for N (1) = N (2) = 1 [15]. The
postulated and experimental points F (1) are applied to sketch f (1). f (1) and
f (2) are the functions of at least eight arguments. We can plot 3D projections
of the eight dimensional space choosing suitable coordinates, Figure 4.
Robinson Crusoe took to his desert island from the sunk ship a gun instead
of coins. A donation can be decided to be greater. Respondents can be mentally
ill. Other reasons can be invented with an intention to invalidate the postulates:
Table 2 (1 - 4, 9 - 12, 16 - 18, 23 - 26); Table 4 (1, 3, 4, 8, 10 - 13, 15, 19, 22,
26, 29 - 32, 34, 36 - 42); Equations 19 - 21. The paper omits such exercises.
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11 Available data and reducing dimension eight
Two-point random variables are the essence of a few prospects reviewed here.
This paper suggests an extension, sample means as awards, replacing these vari-
ables with their mean sums obtained in sequences of independent trials. The
properties of both are well studied theoretically and supported experimentally
including computer simulations. While some properties of sequential Bernoulli
trials such as the law of arcsine are paradoxical and "contradict to common
sense" [24, pp. 91 - 97], the variables are fundamental "simple" candidates to
investigate how randomness of prospects influences on the fractions of respond-
ents selecting between the prospects. With this proposal f (1) = f(a(1)1 , a
(2)
1 ) =
f({A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}, {A(2)p , A(2)q , p(2), N (2)}) depends on eight parameters.
Fixing two coordinates for each dimension, a rough estimate of f (1), requires
28 = 256 points of an experimental plan. Table 5 collects estimates F (1) and
median cash equivalents found in literature.
Table 5: Empirical estimates of f (1) = f(a(1)1 , a
(2)
1 ) =
f({A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}, {A(2)p , A(2)q , p(2), N (2)}); N (1) = N (2) = 1.
# A(1)p A
(1)
q p(1) A
(2)
p A
(2)
q p(2) F (1) Voters Ref Table 2/3/4
1 2500 0 0.33 2400 0 0.34 0.83 72 [15] 15/10/*
2 4000 0 0.80 3000 3000 1 0.20 95 [15] 8/6/25
3 4000 0 0.20 3000 0 0.25 0.65 95 [15] 15/10/*
4 6000 0 0.45 3000 0 0.90 0.14 66 [15] 15/10/*
5 6000 0 0.001 3000 0 0.002 0.73 66 [15] 15/10/*
6 0 -4000 0.20 -3000 -3000 1 0.92 95 [15] 8/6/25
7 0 -4000 0.80 0 -3000 0.75 0.42 95 [15] 6/11/14
8 0 -6000 0.55 0 -3000 0.10 0.92 66 [15] 6/11/14
9 0 -6000 0.999 0 -3000 0.998 0.30 66 [15] 6/11/14
10 1000 0 0.50 500 500 1 0.16 70 [15] 8/6/25
11 0 -1000 0.50 -500 -500 1 0.69 68 [15] 8/6/25
12 5000 0 0.001 5 5 1 0.72 72 [15] 8/6/25
13 0 -5000 0.999 -5 -5 1 0.17 72 [15] 8/6/25
14 1260 1260 1 3394 0 0.50 0.78 72 [15] 22/8/*
15 1260 0 0.10 3394 0 0.05 0.33 72 [15] 13/11/35
16 9 9 1 50 0 0.10 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
17 21 21 1 50 0 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
18 37 37 1 50 0 0.90 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
19 -8 -8 1 0 -50 0.90 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
20 -21 -21 1 0 -50 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
21 -39 -39 1 0 -50 0.10 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
22 14 14 1 100 0 0.05 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
23 25 25 1 100 0 0.25 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
24 36 36 1 100 0 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
Continued on next page
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# A(1)p A
(1)
q p(1) A
(2)
p A
(2)
q p(2) F (1) Voters Ref Table 2/3/4
25 52 52 1 100 0 0.75 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
26 78 78 1 100 0 0.95 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
27 -8 -8 1 0 -100 0.95 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
28 -23.5 -23.5 1 0 -100 0.75 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
29 -42 -42 1 0 -100 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
30 -63 -63 1 0 -100 0.25 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
31 -84 -84 1 0 -100 0.05 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
32 10 10 1 200 0 0.01 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
33 20 20 1 200 0 0.10 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
34 76 76 1 200 0 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
35 131 131 1 200 0 0.90 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
36 188 188 1 200 0 0.99 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
37 -3 -3 1 0 -200 0.99 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
38 -23 -23 1 0 -200 0.90 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
39 -89 -89 1 0 -200 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
40 -155 -155 1 0 -200 0.10 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
41 -190 -190 1 0 -200 0.01 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
42 12 12 1 400 0 0.01 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
43 377 377 1 400 0 0.99 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
44 -14 -14 1 0 -400 0.99 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
45 -380 -380 1 0 -400 0.01 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
46 59 59 1 100 50 0.10 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
47 71 71 1 100 50 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
48 83 83 1 100 50 0.90 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
49 -59 -59 1 -50 -100 0.90 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
50 -71 -71 1 -50 -100 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
51 -85 -85 1 -50 -100 0.10 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
52 64 64 1 150 50 0.05 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
53 72.5 72.5 1 150 50 0.25 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
54 86 86 1 150 50 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
55 102 102 1 150 50 0.75 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
56 128 128 1 150 50 0.95 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
57 -60 -60 1 -50 -150 0.95 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
58 -71 -71 1 -50 -150 0.75 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
59 -92 -92 1 -50 -150 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
60 -113 -113 1 -50 -150 0.25 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
61 -132 -132 1 -50 -150 0.05 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
62 118 118 1 200 100 0.05 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
63 130 130 1 200 100 0.25 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
64 141 141 1 200 100 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
65 162 162 1 200 100 0.75 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
66 178 178 1 200 100 0.95 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
Continued on next page
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# A(1)p A
(1)
q p(1) A
(2)
p A
(2)
q p(2) F (1) Voters Ref Table 2/3/4
67 -112 -112 1 -100 -200 0.95 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
68 -121 -121 1 -100 -200 0.75 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
69 -142 -142 1 -100 -200 0.50 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
70 -158 -158 1 -100 -200 0.25 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
71 -179 -179 1 -100 -200 0.05 ? 25 [51] 22/8/*
72 100 -100 0.65 0 0 1 0.50 ? [55] 8/6/25
73 0 -200 0.20 -100 -100 1 0.50 ? [55] 8/6/25
For points 14 and 15 the prospects were formulated with non-monetary out-
comes where (1) is a one-week tour of England and (2) is a three-week tour
of England, France, and Italy. At the time of this writing the site http:
//www.budgetyourtrip.com/countrylist.php presents the following costs per
day per person: United Kingdom £111.67, France e128.58, and Italy e111.65.
With the exchange rates 0.6205 £/$ and 0.788 e/$ we get modern dollar equi-
valents (1) 111.670.6205 ×7 ≈ 1260 and (2) ( 111.670.6205 + 128.580.788 + 111.650.788 )×7 ≈ 3394. These
modern absolute values with the ratio ≈ 13 and the fractions of respondents ob-
tained more than 35 years ago should be used carefully with low weights. The
points 72 and 73 are referenced by [15].
For points 1 - 15 the numbers of respondents selecting each prospect were
counted [15] and being divided by their total numbers give the estimates F (1)
and complementary F (2).
Median Cash Equivalents. In contrast, for points 16 - 71 a certainty equi-
valent was estimated [51, pp. 305 - 306]. The latter concept, and method can
be illustrated by an example. Errors in the example belong to the author.
Let a(2)1 is {A(2)p = 150, A(2)q = 50, p(2) = 0.25, N (2) = 1}. The certainty
equivalent is the prospect a(1)1 = {A(1)p =?, A(1)q = A(1)p , p(1) = 1, N (1) = 1}.
Given a(2)1 and the expected value 75 = 0.75 × 50 + 0.25 × 150, the goal was
to determine experimentally A(1)p . The authors [51] do not speak about sample
means. Such an interpretation attempts to match their results with the proposed
approach. "The display also [VS: together with the original prospect and expected
value] included a descending series of seven sure outcomes (gains or losses)
logarithmically spaced between the extreme outcomes of the prospect. The subject
indicated a preference between each of the seven sure outcomes and the risky
prospect" [51, p. 305]. It does not say whether the seven plus two extreme
values belong to one dependence, where neighboring logarithms are equidistant.
In the latter case, the logarithm base is not important and the descending values
are members of the geometric progression Ai = A0c−i, i = 0, ..., n + 1, where
n = 7 is the number of sure outcomes. For A0 = 150 and An+1=8 = 50 we get
c = n+1
√
A0
An+1
= 8
√
150
50 ≈ 1.147 and seven sure outcomes 130.75 (+), 113.98 (+),
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99.35 (+), 86.60 (+), 75.49 (-), 65.80 (-), 57.36 (-). Accepted (the sure outcome
is chosen) and rejected (the prospect is selected) values are marked by + and
-. The signs in the example are fictional. "To obtain a more refined estimate of
the certainty equivalent, a new set of seven outcomes was then shown, linearly
spaced between a value 25% higher than the lowest amount accepted in the first
set and a value 25% lower than the highest amount rejected" [51, pp. 305 -
306]. Therefore, the lowest accepted value 86.60 would be increased by 25%
to 108.25 and the highest rejected value 75.49 would be decreased by 25% to
60.39. The interval [60.39, 108.25] would be added by new seven linearly spaced
sure outcomes: 102.27 (+), 96.29 (+), 90.30 (+), 84.32 (+), 78.34 (+), 72.36 (-),
66.37 (-). The mid point between the lowest accepted 78.34 and highest rejected
72.36 values 78.34+72.362 = 75.35 was used as a certainty equivalent. Inconsistent
selections from the first and second sets were rejected by a computer. The
median cash equivalents of the 25 subjects were reported and are cited for points
16 - 71 in columns A(1)p , A
(1)
q .
Placing seven sure and two extreme outcomes on one logarithmic depend-
ence, representing a geometric progression with c > 0, fails, if two extreme
outcomes have a different sign or one of them is zero. The author thinks that
inserting seven values under such conditions creates bias. For two extreme out-
comes 0 and 50, points 16 - 18, one, dividing log(50) by 8 and gradually decre-
menting log(50), reaches 0, where log(50) = log(50)−0 = log(50)− log(1) imply
the prospect {A(2)p = 50, A(2)q = 1, p(2), N (2) = 1} but not {A(2)p = 50, A(2)q =
0, p(2), N (2) = 1}. The same problem arises for points 16 - 45, 73. It would be
also difficult to apply this method to point 72 (−50, 100) provoking bias.
In order to combine results of [15] and [51], the method cited above [51] being
applied to prospects [15] must reproduce the fractions of respondents. [51] has a
different goal - median cash equivalent. The number of subjects 25 in [51] is 2 - 4
times less than the numbers of respondents in [15]. The author cannot conclude
that the median cash equivalent associates with the fractions of respondents
F (1) = F (2) = 12 or other obvious fraction. F
(1) could be obtained after request-
ing respondents to select between two prospects, for instance, {72.5, 72.5, 1, 1}
and {150, 50, 0.25, 1}, point 53, and counting votes. In axioms, if two variables
are deterministically equivalent, then the fractions of respondents are undefined.
Estimates made under such conditions would fluctuate between zero and one.
Points 1, 3 - 5, and 15 with A(1)q = A
(2)
q = 0 are on a six dimensional
projection. The same is true for points 7 - 9 with A(1)p = A
(2)
p = 0.
Sobol Sequences for Experimental Plans. Previous experiments, Table
5, had no a goal to fit f (1) and f (2). They neither fill "uniformly" parts of the
eight dimensional space nor the projection on Figure 4, where a plan should
fill the product-square (0 ≤ p(2) ≤ 1) × (0 ≤ A
(1)
p
A
(2)
p
≤ 1). Ilya Meerovich Sobol
mentions that if dots of a TV 16 × 16 raster are transfered not by rows but
quasi-randomly, then recognition of large objects and their moves is possible
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without waiting when the image will fill all cells and independently on the object
location [50, pp. 3 - 4]. It is worth to consider Sobol sequences [49], [2], [50],
[14] for selecting points in regions, not covered by the axioms, for experimental
estimation of f (1) and f (2).
The ratio A
(1)
p
A
(2)
p
decreases the number of variables. The reduction can be
inadequate, if absolute outcomes matched with income of respondents will result
in outliers, where under other equal conditions more than one value F (1) will
correspond to a single ratio. Similar notes relate to the ratio p
(1)
p(2)
.
Swapping indexes 1 and 2 in Tables 2 - 4 neither eliminates nor adds
uncertainty. It swaps f (1) and f (2) and transforms entries marked by ’*’ in the
last column of Table 5 and meaning "absent in Table 4" to an entry found in the
latter table: 15/10/∗ ↔ 13/11/35, 22/8/∗ ↔ 8/6/25. For instance, experiment
1 from Table 5 corresponds to a case, existing in Table 4, and can be applied
together with other points for estimating parameters of a model function f(x, y).
From 18 unpredictable cases 2, 5 - 7, 9, 14, 16 - 18, 20, 21, 23 - 25, 27, 28, 33,
35 in Table 4, only three 14, 25, 35 with the help of swapping are covered by
available to the author data. The author does not see how to reuse certainty
equivalents for estimating the functions of respondents. In later sections it will
be shown that statistics of lotteries can provide additional points.
It is natural to "aggregate" the eight parameters to means, variances, other
sample mean moments, entropy. These "secondary" quantities may supply a
clearer meaning: variance tells about deviations from mean, entropy is a measure
of uncertainty, etc. The formula for f (1) may get "physical sense".
Figure 4 and the axioms hint that f (1) can be a combination of continuous
and step functions.
We should not forget that f (1) can depend not only on the eight parameters
fully characterizing the sample means underlying the prospects but uncovered
parameters related to respondents. This can lead to several F (1) values collected
from different groups of respondents and corresponding to the same eight values
of arguments. The relationships may change in time. Discrepancies can be
treated as "experimental errors" using statistics as long as they are "acceptably
small". Otherwise, they would promote new dimensions of the problem. It will
be beneficial to sketch projections of f (1) dependent on the eight arguments or
quantities derived from them, where the role of time is in the increasing N (1)
and N (2) and erasing uncertainty.
12 The role of time. Trading, and speculation
If an award or loss is a sample mean, then the role of time is in the elimination
of uncertainty. With time, a high frequency of games increases the number of
trials N . This decreases a sample mean variance, if the variance of a single trial
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Figure 5: 3D projection of the theoretical fraction of respondents selecting a(1)1
with infinite numbers of trials applied for both a(1)1 and a
(2)
1 . Green lines and
surfaces correspond to the postulates. Red areas indicate ambiguity forming
the "vertical wall" of the step function probability slices. A(1)q = A
(2)
q = 0.
is finite [11]. In the limit N →∞, random sample means become deterministic
mathematical expectations. The latter will dominate in decision making, if
large N is reachable and costs nothing, axioms 19 - 21. Estimates made with
the Prokhorov’s inequality 17 show that required N can be large. Figure 4
should "converge" to Figure 5. By the reasons explained later the following is
chosen for N (1) →∞, N (2) →∞, f (1,∞) = 1− f (2,∞)
f (1,∞) =
max(E(a
(1)
1 )− E(a(2)1 ), 0)
max(E(a
(2)
1 )− E(a(1)1 ), 0) + max(E(a(1)1 )− E(a(2)1 ), 0)
. (22)
It takes 0 or 1, is undefined, if the mathematical expectations of two prospects
given by Equation 9 are equal each to other, and agrees with the axioms and
Equation 18: f (∞)(a(1)1 , a
(2)
1 ) + f
(∞)(a(2)1 , a
(1)
1 ) = 1; 0 ≤ f (∞)(a(1)1 , a(2)1 ) ≤ 1 .
In contrast, if a respondent feels that a large number of trials almost zeroing
variance is not reachable in a reasonable time, then his or her choice will be
influenced not only by mathematical expectations. Buyers of Mega Million and
Powerball tickets "prove" it, when the jackpots are renewed and the expectation
of the game is negative. The case N = 1 is embedded into Kahneman’s and
Tversky’s prospects [15], [51].
In trading and market speculation there is a lack of control that a decision
to buy or sell a security or contract is made under the same conditions. A par-
ticipant focusing on a rule or pattern ignores other factors possibly affecting a
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next price or rate move. The majority feels a uniqueness of trading opportunity
and inability to "play" endlessly and deviates from mathematical expectations.
This tendency was described by Livermore [28] prior Kahneman’s and Tver-
sky’s systematic research, demolishing the utility theory and adding valuable
experimental points to the functions of choice.
An apologist of the Technical Analysis [32] can argue that formations of trad-
ing price patterns or indicator values themselves point to repetition of under-
lying conditions. Without presenting evidences of such dependencies a healthy
criticism is born because many patterns can appear as a result of random walk
[29]. Less cited but not less important mathematical properties of a symmetric
random walk are described in [24], [10].The review of the Technical Analysis [33]
leaves to a speculator "hopes on systematic success", following from non-linear
properties of the real financial time-series. There is a lack of published results
in this area. In [40], [41], [42] the author concludes that as long as a market
creates frequent opportunities to make large profits, speculation will exist, and
suggests measuring the frequencies and potential profits using the maximum
profit strategy, which is an objective market property.
A point of view distinguishing between economic risk and uncertainty situ-
ations is presented in [21]. While the risk assumes probability distributions
known at the outset, uncertain situations imply absence of the probability mod-
els describing them. Frank Knight talks about [21, p. 232]: ... that higher form
of uncertainty not susceptible to measurement and hence to elimination. He
concludes: It is this true uncertainty which by presenting the theoretically per-
fect outworking of the tendencies of competition gives the characteristic form of
"enterprise" to economic organizations as a whole and accounts for the peculiar
income of the entrepreneur. The author believes that inability to measure such
uncertainty also deals with fundamental limits of the probability theory requir-
ing repetition of events and trials. Trading is full of individual random objects.
An E-mini S&P 500 future contract price time series is unique. Ability to check
presence of the "same" conditions for making decisions based on the past time
series is limited. Classics well understood the limits of the probability theory
[25]. The latter work summarizes three approaches and definitions of random-
ness of an individual sequence of 0s and 1s based on the theory of algorithms.
In contrast with these difficulties, the size and frequency of market offers meas-
ured by the maximum profit strategy do not become less intensive [42]. In the
sense described here, time decreases the variance of the sample mean awards
and "evaporates" their uncertainty.
John Jr. Kelly [17] introduces the exponential rate of growth of the gambler’s
capital as the limit G = limN→∞ 1N log2
VN
V0
. It is possible to show that under
his conditions and for his function VN = (1 + `)W (1− `)LV0 with the constant
bet allocation fraction `, whereW and L are the numbers of wins and losses and
V0 and VN is the initial and after N bets capital, this limit coincides with the
mathematical expectation E(GN ) for arbitrary positive integer N . This implies
that the process GN is not a martingale, see definition in [8, p. 91]. Formulas
suitable for futures trading based on the allocation fraction of the capital for a
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next trade are considered in [53], [54], and [39, pp. 55 - 79]. Kelly’s approach is a
bright example demonstrating that people may rely not only on a mathematical
expectation of a game. Another famous example is the Sharpe ratio [46].
Khinchin [18] well understood the influence of the growing number of tri-
als on the properties of the arithmetic and geometric sample means in the St.
Petersburg game. However, his two theorems do not allow to estimate a con-
vergence rate of the means. Such estimates based on his theorems have been
obtained on a computer [43]. Prokhorov’s estimate, when it can be applied, is
a key to verification of influence of time linearly affecting the number of trials
under a condition of constant frequency of trials.
13 The functions of choice f (1) and f (2)
The random difference of the two independent random variables η = a(1)1 −
a
(2)
1 characterizes absolute advantage, if it is positive, or disadvantage, if it is
negative, of the award a(1)1 over a
(2)
1 . Independence simplifies formulas for the
moments due to known relationships for ξ = ξ(1) + ξ(2) [11, p. 70]:
α1 = α
(1)
1 + α
(2)
2 , µ2 = µ
(1)
2 + µ
(2)
2 , µ3 = µ
(1)
3 + µ
(2)
3 ,
µ4 = µ
(1)
4 + 6µ
(1)
2 µ
(2)
2 + µ
(2)
4 .
It can be proved that for the difference ξ = ξ(1) − ξ(2) two of the four formulas
have to change to α1 = α
(1)
1 − α(2)2 and µ3 = µ(1)3 − µ(2)3 . Using equations from
section "Problem 3 from Kahneman and Tversky" we get for two-point variables
E(η) = α1(η) = (A
(1)
p −A(1)q )p(1) +A(1)q − (A(2)p −A(2)q )p(2) −A(2)q , (23)
D(η) = µ2(η) =
(A
(1)
p −A(1)q )2p(1)(1− p(1))
N (1)
+
(A
(2)
p −A(2)q )2p(2)(1− p(2))
N (2)
,
(24)
µ3(η) =
(A
(1)
p −A(1)q )3(p(1) − 3p(1)2 + 2p(1)3)
N (1)2
− (A
(2)
p −A(2)q )3(p(2) − 3p(2)2 + 2p(2)3)
N (2)2
,
(25)
µ4(η) =
(A
(1)
p −A(1)q )4p(1)(1− p(1))[1 + 3(N (1) − 2)p(1)(1− p(1))]
N (1)3
+
+6
(A
(1)
p −A(1)q )2p(1)(1− p(1))(A(2)p −A(2)q )2p(2)(1− p(2))
N (1)N (2)
+
+
(A
(2)
p −A(2)q )4p(2)(1− p(2))[1 + 3(N (2) − 2)p(2)(1− p(2))]
N (2)3
,
(26)
γ1(η) =
µ3(η)√
µ2(η)3
, (27)
γ2(η) =
µ4(η)
µ2(η)2
− 3. (28)
31
Figure 6: Properties of η = a(1)1 −a(2)2 for Problem 3 (certainty effect), where p(1)1
changes from 0 to 1 for different values of N (1). Plots are done using gnuplot
http://www.gnuplot.info/.
Figure 7: Properties of η = a(1)1 − a(2)2 for Problem 3’ (reflection effect), where
p
(1)
1 changes from 0 to 1 for different values of N
(1). Plots are done using gnuplot
http://www.gnuplot.info/.
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For N (1) = N (2) = 1, the four values of η and corresponding probabilities are
η1 = A
(1)
p −A(2)p , p1 = p(1)p(2);
η2 = A
(1)
p −A(2)q , p2 = p(1)(1− p(2));
η3 = A
(1)
q −A(2)p , p3 = (1− p(1))p(2);
η4 = A
(1)
q −A(2)q , p4 = (1− p(1))(1− p(2));
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, η1p1 + η2p2 + η3p3 + η4p4 = E(η).
(29)
Dependencies of statistics of the random difference η on probability of the out-
come A(1)p = 4000 and number of trials N (1) for Problem 3 (certainty effect)
are plotted on Figure 6 and illustrate formulas 23 - 28. Dependencies of η on
probability of the outcome A(1)q = −4000 and number of trials N (1) for Problem
3’ (reflection effect) are presented on Figure 7.
Ratio of Fractions. Let f(a
(1)
1 ,a
(2)
1 )
f(a
(2)
1 ,a
(1)
1 )
= r. Then, from Equation 18 f(a(1)1 , a
(2)
1 ) =
r
1+r , f(a
(2)
1 , a
(1)
1 ) =
1
1+r . We shall search for an expression for r.
How much a(1)1 can be greater than a
(2)
1 ? If both are deterministic, then our
answer is max(a(1)1 − a(2)1 , 0). The function max is applied to the difference in
order to emphasize the adjective greater. If the difference is negative, then a(1)1
is not greater than a(2)1 : the positive excess is zero. If both are random, then
on average our answer is max(E(a(1)1 )−E(a(2)1 ), 0) = max(E(η), 0). But not on
average it can be greater and we express it adding a(η) ≥ 0 standard deviations
to the mean max(E(η) + a(η)
√
D(η), 0) = max(ηhigh, 0), where ηhigh ≤ ηmax.
When one or both sample means are random, a(1)1 can be less than a
(2)
1 . How
much less we express as a non-negative quantity |min(E(η)− b(η)√D(η), 0)| =
|min(ηlow, 0)| = −min(ηlow, 0), where ηmin ≤ ηlow. The number b(η) ≥ 0 does
not have to be equal to a(η) ≥ 0, if the distribution of η is not symmetrical. How
much a(1)1 can be less than a
(2)
1 is equal to that how much a
(2)
1 can be greater
than a(1)1 : |min(E(a(1)1 )−E(a(2)1 )−b(η)
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) +D(a
(2)
1 ), 0)| = max(E(a(2)1 )−
E(a
(1)
1 ) + b(η)
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) +D(a
(2)
1 ), 0). How much a
(1)
1 can be greater than a
(2)
1
is equal to that how much a(2)1 can be less than a
(1)
1 : max(E(a
(1)
1 ) − E(a(2)1 ) +
a(η)
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) +D(a
(2)
1 ), 0) = |min(E(a(2)1 )−E(a(1)1 )−a(η)
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) +D(a
(2)
1 ), 0)|.
Hypothesis. The ratio of the fractions of respondents is the ratio of how much
a
(1)
1 can be greater than a
(2)
1 to how much a
(2)
1 can be greater than a
(1)
1
r =
f (1)
f (2)
=
f(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 )
f(a
(2)
1 , a
(1)
1 )
=
max(E(η) + a(η)
√
D(η), 0)
|min(E(η)− b(η)√D(η), 0)| , (30)
f (1) =
max(E(η) + a(η)
√
D(η), 0)
max(−E(η) + b(η)√D(η), 0) + max(E(η) + a(η)√D(η), 0) , (31)
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f (2) =
max(−E(η) + b(η)√D(η), 0)
max(−E(η) + b(η)√D(η), 0) + max(E(η) + a(η)√D(η), 0) . (32)
In general, the ratio of the fractions of respondents choosing between two random
or deterministic prospects is the ratio of how much the first prospect can be
"better" than the second to how much the second can be "better" than the first.
Equations 30 - 32 express what is "better" for two sample means. As long as
common rational sense underlies "better", fractions depend on prospects only.
If "better" is dominated by subjective preferences, then the formulas can stop
working. In a private discussion with Pavel Grosul, it was emphasized that the
same money means different things for respondents with different wealth. In [15]
and [51] a care was taken to choose some outcomes comparable or intentionally
deviating from a monthly income. Accounting such effects requires a distribution
of respondents by income and/or wealth. Equations above can hide subjective
complexity in a(η, subjective parameters) and b(η, subjective parameters),
but do not pretend to become formula amoris or equations of attractiveness ...
Constraints. If D(η) = 0, then Equation 31 ≡ 22. Natural constraints are
0 ≤ a ≤ ηmax − E(η)√
D(η)
; 0 ≤ b ≤ E(η)− ηmin√
D(η)
; 0 ≤ a+ b ≤ ηmax − ηmin√
D(η)
,
ηmax = a
(1)
1,max − a(2)1,min =
A
(1)
maxN (1)
N (1)
− A
(2)
minN
(2)
N (2)
= A(1)max −A(2)min,
ηmin = a
(1)
1,min − a(2)1,max =
A
(1)
minN
(1)
N (1)
− A
(2)
maxN (2)
N (2)
= A
(1)
min −A(2)max,
ηmax − ηmin = (A(1)max −A(1)min) + (A(2)max −A(2)min).
(33)
For two-point variables A(1)max = A
(1)
p , A
(1)
min = A
(1)
q , A
(2)
max = A
(2)
p , A
(2)
min = A
(2)
q
0 ≤ a(η) ≤ (A
(1)
p −A(1)q )(1− p(1)) + (A(2)p −A(2)q )p(2)√
D(η)
,
0 ≤ b(η) ≤ (A
(1)
p −A(1)q )p(1) + (A(2)p −A(2)q )(1− p(2))√
D(η)
.
(34)
The amax(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) and bmax(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) posses the property that swapping in-
dexes 1 and 2 transforms a to b and vice versa. If the same property holds for
other a(η) and b(η), then f (1)(a(1)1 , a
(2)
1 ) and f
(2)(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) will have it too be-
cause the remaining E(η) and D(η) already have it. This would allow to write
f (1)(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) = f(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) and f
(2)(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) = f(a
(2)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) and use one
function. If
√
D(η) = 0, then a(η) and b(η) can be arbitrary finite numbers.
In Problem 3 ηmax = 4000 − 3000 = 1000, ηmin = 0 − 3000 = −3000,
E(η) = 200, and
√
D(η) = 1600. Therefore, 0 ≤ a ≤ 12 and 0 ≤ b ≤ 2. Any
pair (a, b) satisfying the equation b = 4a + 58 with 0 ≤ a being substituted to
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Equations 31 and 32 yields f (1) = 0.2 and f (2) = 0.8 experimentally found for
Problem 3. Intersection with constrains gives 0 ≤ a ≤ 1132 and 58 ≤ b ≤ 2.
In Problem 3’ ηmax = 0 − (−3000) = 3000, ηmin = −4000 − (−3000) =
−1000, E(η) = −200, and √D(η) = 1600. Therefore, 0 ≤ a ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ b ≤ 12 .
Any pair (a, b) obeying b = 223a− 25184 with 0 ≤ b yields f (1) = 0.92 and f (2) =
0.08 observed for Problem 3’. Intersection with constraints gives 2516 ≤ a ≤ 2
and 0 ≤ b ≤ 7184 . The solution lines for Problem 3 and 3’ intersect at (a =− 736 , b = − 1172 ), which violates constraints: there is no one pair satisfying both
problems. The a and b obeying constraints 33 ensure predictable properties.
If f (1) or f (2) are not equal to zero or one, then the formulated relation-
ships 30 - 33 imply dependence between a and b because from two fractions of
respondents only one is independent. If ηlow < 0 < ηhigh, then
b(η) =
E(η) + a(η)
√
D(η)(1− f (1))
f (1)
√
D(η)
=
a(η)
r
+
E(η)√
D(η)
1
f (1)
, (35)
where η = a(1)1 − a(2)1 . E(η)√D(η) can be interpreted as a Sharpe ratio, where a
(1)
1 is
not a return but a sample mean over or under a benchmark sample mean a(2)1 .
Case of i.i.d. If a(1)1 and a
(2)
1 are i.i.d., then E(η) = 0, 0 < D(η) (non-constant
variables), and f (1) = a(η)a(η)+b(η) . From Equations 24 and 34, amax = bmax =
N
2p(1−p) . Similar to equal constants, there is no rational sense to select between
two identical random quantities and f (1) must be undefined. We conclude that
in this case a(η) = b(η) = 0.
Disjoint and adjacent intervals. In Equation 31 the first max in the denom-
inator is zero, if −E(η) + b(η)√D(η) ≤ −E(η) + bmax(η)√D(η) = −E(η) +
E(η) − ηmin = −ηmin = A(2)max − A(1)min ≤ 0. f (1) =
max(E(η)+a
√
D(η),0)
0+max(E(η)+a
√
D(η),0)
for A(2)max ≤ A(1)min. The second max is zero, if E(η) + a(η)
√
D(η) ≤ E(η) +
amax(η)
√
D(η) = E(η) + ηmax − E(η) = ηmax = A(1)max − A(2)min ≤ 0. Thus,
f (1) = 00+0 is undefined, if A
(2)
max ≤ A(1)min and A(1)max ≤ A(2)min. This implies
A
(2)
min = A
(2)
max = A
(1)
min = A
(1)
max. If only one of the inequalities holds, then
Equation 31 correctly returns 1 or 0 corresponding to predictable properties.
Cases E(η) = 0. For 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 23, and 33 in Table 5,
√
D(η)
vanishes from Equations 30 - 32, and r = ab , f
(1) = aa+b , f
(2) = ba+b , Table 6.
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Table 6: Computed properties of a(1)1 , a
(2)
2 , and η = a
(1)
1 − a(2)2 for
N (1) = N (2) = 1, E(η) = 0, and experimental F from Table 5.
# ξ Ap Aq p E
√
D γ1 γ2 H F Table 5
1 a(1)1 6000 0 0.45 2700 2985 0.201 -1.96 0.993 0.14 4
a
(2)
1 3000 0 0.9 2700 900 -2.67 5.11 0.469 0.86 4
η 0 3118 0.24 -1.61 1.46 1.00
2 a(1)1 6000 0 0.001 6 190 31.6 995 0.011 0.73 5
a
(2)
1 3000 0 0.002 6 134 22.3 495 0.021 0.27 5
η 0 232 12.9 497 0.032 1.00
3 a(1)1 0 -6000 0.55 -2700 2985 -0.201 -1.96 0.993 0.92 8
a
(2)
1 0 -3000 0.1 -2700 900 2.67 5.11 0.469 0.08 8
η 0 3118 -0.24 -1.61 1.46 1.00
4 a(1)1 0 -6000 0.999 -6 190 -31.6 995 0.011 0.30 9
a
(2)
1 0 -3000 0.998 -6 134 -22.3 495 0.021 0.70 9
η 0 232 -12.9 497 0.032 1.00
5 a(1)1 1000 0 0.5 500 500 0 -2 1 0.16 10
a
(2)
1 500 500 1 500 0 0 -3 0 0.84 10
η 0 500 0 -2 1 1.00
6 a(1)1 0 -1000 0.5 -500 500 0 -2 1 0.69 11
a
(2)
1 -500 -500 1 -500 0 0 -3 0 0.31 11
η 0 500 0 -2 1 1.00
7 a(1)1 5000 0 0.001 5 158 31.6 995 0.011 0.72 12
a
(2)
1 5 5 1 5 0 0 -3 0 0.28 12
η 0 158 31.6 995 0.011 1.00
8 a(1)1 0 -5000 0.999 -5 158 -31.6 995 0.011 0.17 13
a
(2)
1 -5 -5 1 -5 0 0 -3 0 0.83 13
η 0 158 -31.6 995 0.011 1.00
9 a(1)1 25 25 1 25 0 0 -3 0 ? 23
a
(2)
1 100 0 0.25 25 43 1.15 -0.667 0.81 ? 23
η 0 43 -1.15 -0.667 0.81 1.00
10 a(1)1 20 20 1 20 0 0 -3 0 ? 33
a
(2)
1 200 0 0.1 20 60 2.67 5.11 0.469 ? 33
η 0 60 -2.67 5.11 0.469 1.00
If profits are comparable Table 6(1, 2, 5), then the greater entropy, the less
the fraction of respondents. The entropy, characterizing uncertainty, becomes a
measure of the certainty effect. If one profit is significantly greater than other
and the latter is not attractive, then uncertainty is less important than a pos-
sibility to become rich, Table 6(7). The entropy depends only on probabilities.
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If losses are comparable Table 6(3, 4, 6), then the greater entropy, the greater
the fraction of respondents. Now, entropy measures reflection effect. If one loss
is significantly worse than other and the latter is not critical, then uncertainty
is less important comparing with a possibility of financial ruin, Table 6(8).
For profits Table 6(5, 7), E(η) = 0, A(1)q = 0, p(2) = 1. Therefore,
A
(1)
p p(1) = A
(2)
p ,
√
D(a
(2)
1 ) = 0,
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) = A
(1)
p
√
p(1)(1−p(1))
N(1)
= A
(2)
p
√
1−p(1)
p(1)N(1)
,
limp(1)→0
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) =∞. Author’s attention is attracted by one rational and
two experimental points (
√
D(a
(1)
1 ), F
(1)): (0, 1)p(1)=1, (158, 0.72)12, (500, 0.16)10,
which are close to a straight line.
For losses Table 6(6, 8), E(η) = 0, A(1)p = 0, p(2) = 0. Hence, A
(1)
q (1−p(1)) =
A
(2)
q ,
√
D(a
(2)
1 ) = 0,
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) = |A(1)q |
√
p(1)(1−p(1))
N(1)
= |A(2)q |
√
p(1)
(1−p(1))N(1) ,
limp(1)→1
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) =∞. Author’s attention is attracted by one rational and
two experimental points (
√
D(a
(1)
1 ), F
(1)): (0, 0)p(1)=0, (158, 0.17)13, (500, 0.69)11,
which are close to a straight line.
In both cases the standard deviation can approach infinity, while 0 ≤ F (1) ≤
1. Therefore, lines F (1) = slope×
√
D(a
(1)
1 ) + intercept cannot be adequate on
the beam [0,∞). The behavior on the right side is not obvious for the author.
At first glance, decreasing dependence for profits could asymptotically approach
the standard deviation axis F (1) → 0 being a mirrored S-shaped curve bound
to the point (0, 1). However, if A(2)p is tiny, one cent, comparing with a healthy
monthly income, then large but less probable A(1)p =
A(2)p
p(1)
can become attractive.
It gives a chance to "become rich" momentarily, while one cent would not make
a principal difference anyway. We recollect people playing lotteries.
Similarly, a tiny definite loss can be preferred to a huge, life, but probabil-
istically negligible one, where |A(1)q | = |A
(2)
q |
1−p(1) . Such a preference does not look
for the author irrational.
Two curves of fractions of respondents dependent on variances of random
prospects and fitting rational and experimental points are plotted on Figure 8.
They asymptotically approach zero (profits) or one (losses). The fitting curves
are F (1)profit =
K
K+(
√
D(a
(1)
1 ))
k
, and F (1)loss =
(
√
D(a
(1)
1 ))
m
M+(
√
D(a
(1)
1 ))
m
. The latter equation
is mathematically equivalent to the Archibald Hill’s equation describing the
sigmoidal oxygen binding curve of hemoglobin [13]. In the particular casem = 2,
the equation transforms to D(a
(1)
1 )
M+D(a
(1)
1 )
, which is mathematically equivalent to the
Leonor Michaelis - Maud Menten equation describing enzyme kinetics. Both can
be written as straight line equations in bilogarithmic scales ln(rprofit) = ln(K)−
k
2 ln(D(a
(1)
1 )), and ln(rloss) =
m
2 ln(D(a
(2)
1 )) − ln(M) each fitting two points
exactly with K = 238505.5242, k = 2.259253618, and M = 174976.0287,m =
2.071333117. The differences in K, M , and k, m take care about description of
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Figure 8: Table 5(10, 12): E(η) = 0, A(1)q = A
(2)
q = 0, p(2) = 1, N (1) = N (2) = 1,
F
(1)
profit =
238505.5242
238505.5242+(
√
D(a
(1)
1 ))
2.259253618
. Table 5(11, 13): E(η) = 0, A(1)p =
A
(2)
p = 0, p(2) = 0, N (1) = N (2) = 1, F
(1)
loss =
(
√
D(a
(1)
1 ))
2.071333117
174976.0287+(
√
D(a
(1)
1 ))
2.071333117
.
certainty and reflection effects. Absence of data on the right side of dependencies
leaves the question about asymptotic properties open.
Selecting between Constant and Random Two-Point Variables. Equa-
tions 31 and 32 correctly describe rational properties where D(η) = 0. Under
other conditions, they switch computation of fractions of respondents to evalu-
ation of a, b, and possible dependences between them.
Let the first variable is constant {A(1)p , A(1)q = A(1)p , p(1) = 1, 1 ≤ N (1) =
N (2)} and second - random {A(2)p = A(1)p /R,A(2)q = 0, p(2) ∈ [0, 1], 1 ≤ N (2) =
N (1)}, where 0 < R. Compare the surface on Figure 9 with experimental and
axiomatic points on Figure 4. For large N (1) = N (2) = 109 Figure 10 is getting
closer to Figure 5 following from Equation 22. The surfaces are computed using
Equations 23, 24, and 31. Fitting depends on a, and b.
From Equations 24 and 34, if the first variable is constant and the second is
random two-point, then amax =
√
p(2)N(2)
1−p(2) , bmax =
√
(1−p(2))N(2)
p(2)
, amaxbmax =
N (2). Swapping constant and random variables yields amax =
√
(1−p(1))N(1)
p(1)
,
bmax =
√
p(1)N(1)
1−p(1) , amaxbmax = N
(1).
Lottery. In lotteries, one selects between a random variable with large win,
small ticket price, tiny winning probability {A(1)p = large,A(2)q = −small, p(1) =
tiny,N (1) = 1} and the constant {A(2)p = 0, A(2)q = 0, p(2) = 1, N (2) = 1}.
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Figure 9: f (1)({A(1)p = 3000, A(1)q = 3000, p(1) = 1, N (1) = 1}, {A(1)p /R,A(2)q =
0, p(2), N (2) = 1}) vs. p(2) ∈ [0, 1] and R ∈ [0.000001, 2], a = 1, b = 2/3. Plot is
done using Maple 10 from Maplesoft.
Figure 10: f (1)({A(1)p = 3000, A(1)q = 3000, p(1) = 1, N (1) = 109},
{A(1)p /R,A(2)q = 0, p(2), N (2) = 109}) vs. p(2) ∈ [0, 1] and R ∈ [0.000001, 2],
a = 1, b = 2/3. Plot is done using Maple 10 from Maplesoft.
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Figure 11: A typical Mega Millions jackpot growth curve before dropping to
initial jackpot. The data is taken from http://www.lottostrategies.com/
script/jackpot_history/draw_date/113. Plot is done using Microsoft Excel.
Usually, the greater the jackpot, the faster it grows, Figure 11. If the jackpot
is won, then the curve drops to the initial jackpot J0. This creates the sequence
of "teeth" with random height and width at the bottom. Dependence after
J0 resembles the exponential solution JE(t) = J0 expk(t−t0) of the equation
dJ
dt = kJ with the initial condition JE(t0) = J0. This solution cannot describe
random shape of the teeth and sharp dropping at random time. The jackpot,
even, without dropping, could not grow to infinity. Hence, the S-shaped logistic
curve JL(t) =
JmaxJ0 exp(k(t−t0))
Jmax+J0(exp(k(t−t0))−1) , solving the equation
dJ
dt = kJ(1 − JJmax )
developed with other denominations by Pierre Francois Verhulst and Lamberte
Adolphe Jacques Quetelet for describing population growth, is a better fitting
choice. Without data close to Jmax, estimation of this level is inaccurate. The
Richards’ generalized logistic function [38] is more flexible. With credit to http:
//www.lottostrategies.com/script/jackpot_history/draw_date/113, the
author presents the data in Table 7 for those who wants to try other fitting
options. The exponential and logistic curves were applied minimizing the sum of
square deviations (Microsoft Excel, Solver), which is not a well justified criterion
in this case. A(1)p = J + A
(1)
q with A
(1)
q < 0 does not take into account a
possibility of sharing jackpot between winners. For simplicity, we also ignore
multiple winning outcomes and taxes described in Section "Mega Millions".
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Table 7: A growth of Mega Millions Jackpot J before dropping
to J0 = 15, 000, 000, JL(t) =
500,000,000×15,000,000×exp(19.748t)
500,000,000+15,000,000×(exp(19.748t)−1) ,
JE(t) = 15, 000, 000 × exp(16.232t),
∑
∆J2L=1.3e+15,∑
∆J2E=7.2e+15.
Date t, years J , real Jnext − J JL(t) (J − JL)2 JE(t) (J − JE)2
3/27/2015 0.0000 15000000 5000000 15000000 0.0e+00 15000000 0.0e+00
3/31/2015 0.0110 20000000 5000000 18490306 2.3e+12 17920342 4.3e+12
4/3/2015 0.0192 25000000 5000000 21608026 1.2e+13 20478002 2.0e+13
4/7/2015 0.0301 30000000 9000000 26551757 1.2e+13 24464854 3.1e+13
4/10/2015 0.0384 39000000 8000000 30941404 6.5e+13 27956572 1.2e+14
4/14/2015 0.0493 47000000 8000000 37851574 8.4e+13 33399424 1.8e+14
4/17/2015 0.0575 55000000 10000000 43935991 1.2e+14 38166318 2.8e+14
4/21/2015 0.0685 65000000 9000000 53417755 1.3e+14 45596900 3.8e+14
4/24/2015 0.0767 74000000 11000000 61670446 1.5e+14 52104664 4.8e+14
4/28/2015 0.0877 85000000 11000000 74355473 1.1e+14 62248896 5.2e+14
5/1/2015 0.0959 96000000 14000000 85225587 1.2e+14 71133297 6.2e+14
5/5/2015 0.1068 110000000 16000000 101632292 7.0e+13 84982204 6.3e+14
5/8/2015 0.1151 126000000 14000000 115408834 1.1e+14 97111190 8.3e+14
5/12/2015 0.1260 140000000 19000000 135724730 1.8e+13 116017720 5.8e+14
5/15/2015 0.1342 159000000 14000000 152355179 4.4e+13 132576214 7.0e+14
5/19/2015 0.1452 173000000 21000000 176195256 1.0e+13 158387412 2.1e+14
5/22/2015 0.1534 194000000 20000000 195128304 1.3e+12 180993072 1.7e+14
5/26/2015 0.1644 214000000 19000000 221398922 5.5e+13 216230524 5.0e+12
5/29/2015 0.1726 233000000 27000000 241565629 7.3e+13 247091774 2.0e+14
6/2/2015 0.1836 260000000 ? 268580467 7.4e+13 295197950 1.2e+15
The choice {A(1)p = 232, 999, 999, A(1)q = −1, p(1) = 1258,890,850 , N (1) = 1} vs.
{A(2)p = 0, A(2)q = 0, p(2) = 0, N (2) = 1} should be made on 5/29/2015. The
jackpot has grown to 260,000,000. We assume that 27,000,000 is one third of
the number of purchased tickets 81,000,000. Since quoting is done by annuity,
the number of tickets is less. Based on Section "Mega Millions", we estimate
the number of purchased tickets as half ≈ 40,000,000.
Mega Millions http://www.megamillions.com/where-to-play is played
in 44 states AR 2,966,369, AZ 6,731,484, CA 38,802,500, CO 5,355,866, CT
3,596,677, DE 935,614, FL 19,893,297, GA 10,097,343, IA 3,107,124, ID 1,634,464,
IL 12,880,580, IN 6,596,855, KS 2,904,021, KY 4,413,457, LA 4,649,676, MA
6,745,408, MD 5,976,407, ME 1,330,089, MI 9,909,877, MN 5,458,333, MO
6,063,589, MT 1,023,579, NC 9,943,964, ND 739,482, NE 1,881,503, NH 87,137
2013, NJ 8,938,175, NM 2,085,572, NY 19,746,227, OH 11,594,163, OK 3,878,051,
OR 3,970,239, PA 12,787,209, RI 1,055,173, SC 4,832,482, SD 853,175, TN
6,549,352, TX 27,695,284, VA 8,326,289, VT 626,562, WA 7,061,530, WI 5,757,564,
WV 1,850,326, WY 584,153, the District of Columbia 658,893, and U.S. Virgin
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islands 106,405 2010 census. The population estimates are from Wikipedia for
the year 2014 unless the year is cited. The sum is 302,681,519. One must be
18 years or older to purchase lottery tickets. In accordance with the United
States Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/population/age/, in 2010 the
population under 18 years was 24 percent. We estimate the number of potential
buyers as 0.76× 302, 681, 519 ≈ 230, 037, 954.
If the numbers of people from P1 to Pm buy the numbers of tickets from
n1 to nm, then the number of buyers is
∑i=m
i=1 Pi, the number of bought tickets
is
∑i=m
i=1 Pini, the mean number of purchased tickets per buyer is nmean =∑i=m
i=1 Pini∑i=m
i=1 Pi
, the number of not playing people is P −∑i=mi=1 Pi, and the number of
potential tickets, which they did not buy, is nmean(P −
∑i=m
i=1 Pi). The fraction
of purchased tickets to the total of purchased and potentially not purchased
ones is
∑i=m
i=1 Pini∑i=m
i=1 Pini+nmean(P−
∑i=m
i=1 Pi)
=
∑i=m
i=1 Pi
P . The latter is the fraction f
(1)
of those, who decided to play. With nmean = 5, f (1) = 40,000,0005×230,037,954 ≈ 0.035. We
conclude that lotteries can be used to estimate fractions of respondents selecting
between random and constant variables or prospects.
For this problem, E(η) = −0.10, √D(η) = 14, 480.97, ηmin = −1, ηmax =
232, 999, 999, γ1(η) = 16, 090.09, γ2(η) = 258, 890, 848, H(η)=1.15e-7. The big
positive skewness γ1 overweights the certain loss prediction following from the
tiny entropy H. As long as JL is not won, the A
(1)
p = JL(t) +A
(1)
q , ηmax, E(η),
and D(η) increase with t. In contrast, in this hypothetical lottery, probabilities
and dependent only on them γ1, γ2, and H remain intact. JL(t), Figure 11,
grows with acceleration before it reaches the second part of S-shaped curve,
where the capital of dreamers exhausts. This acceleration is the increasing
number of tickets from game to game and, therefore, increasing f (1) and ab .
To estimate f (1), multiply the values from column J(next) − J of Table 7 by
3× 12
5×230,037,954 ≈ 1.3× 10−9.
The previous paragraph evaluates f (1)(t) = 1.3×10−9×(J(t+∆t)−J(t)) =
C × (J(t+ ∆t)− J(t)). Replacing J(t) with JL(t) yields
f (1)(t) =
C × (Jmax − J0)JmaxJ0ekt(ek∆t − 1)
(Jmax − J0)2 + (Jmax − J0)J0ekt(ek∆t + 1) + (J0ekt)2ek∆t (36)
This formula implies that, if the jackpot is not won, then f (1) has a maximum:
growing interest during the first phase is suppressed by a lack of the capital
later. Setting df
(1)
dt = 0, we get tmax =
1
k ln(
Jmax−J0
J0e
k∆t
2
). Substituting tmax into
Equation 36 leads to f (1)max = C×Jmax(e
k∆t
2 −1)
e
k∆t
2 +1
, Figure 12. The estimate Jmax ≈
500,000,000 is inaccurate because of a lack of data at the saturation of J . Twice
jackpot was greater, Table 1. Due to 34, 0 ≤ a(η) ≤
√
1−p(1)
p(1)
= 16, 090.09 and
0 ≤ b(η) ≤
√
p(1)
1−p(1) =
1
16,090.09 . The amax and bmax are constant reciprocals of
each other but a and b depend on A(1)p and J .
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Figure 12: Equation 36, C = 1.3× 10−9, Jmax = 500,000,000, J0 = 15,000,000,
∆t = 0.011, k = 19.748, Plot is done using Microsoft Excel.
Relationship between a(a(1)1 , a
(2)
1 ) and b(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ). From odd E(−η) =
−E(η) and evenD(−η) = D(η) properties and Equation 31 it follows that Equa-
tion 18 holds and one function of choice f(a(1)1 , a
(2)
1 ) is sufficient, if a(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) =
b(a
(2)
1 , a
(1)
1 ) and b(a
(1)
1 , a
(2)
1 ) = a(a
(2)
1 , a
(1)
1 ).
Fixing E(η) and
√
D(η), Equation 31 draws a surface above the ab-plane. A
curve on the ab-plane defines a dependence between a and b. This dependence
is linear, Equation 35, if f (1) is also fixed. It is easy to prove that intersection
of the surface and the plane, containing this straight line, and orthogonal to the
ab-plane is also a horizontal straight line. Figure 13 illustrates these geometric
properties for Problem 3, certainty effect. The surface looking curvy is a set of
horizontal straight line segments, each located at its own characteristic height
f (1), with slope and intersect given by Equation 35. Figure 14 presents a similar
picture for Problem 3’, reflection effect.
Dependence b(a) for fixed E(η) and
√
D(η) does not have to be linear. If it
is not linear or linear but has different slope and intercept than those, implied
by Equation 35, then f (1) is not constant. Let E(η) = const1, and D(η) =
const2 ≥ 0 for f (1)({A(1)p , A(1)q , p(1), N (1)}, {A(2)p , A(2)q = A(2)p , p(2) = 1, N (2)}),
random two-point variable vs. constant. Then, from Equations 23 - 28
p(1) =
1
1 + const2N
(1)
(const1+A
(2)
q −A(1)q )2
, (37)
γ1(η) =
1− 2p(1)√
p(1)(1− p(1))N (1) , γ2(η) =
1
p(1)(1− p(1))N (1) −
6
N (1)
. (38)
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Figure 13: Problem 3. Surface f (1)(a, b) for E(η) = 200,
√
D(η) = 1600. Line
b = 4a + 58 corresponds to f
(1) = 0.20. Plot is done using Maple 10 from
Maplesoft.
Figure 14: Problem 3’. Surface f (1)(a, b) for E(η) = −200, √D(η) = 1600.
Line b = 223a − 25184 corresponds to f (1) = 0.92. Plot is done using Maple 10
from Maplesoft.
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With Equation 37 we can design η = a(1)1 − a(2)1 , change p(1), N (1), and keep
E(η), D(η) constant. From Equations 38 this affects ηth skewness and excess
kurtosis. Symmetry of the distribution can influence on respondents preferences.
This leaves degrees of freedom for f (1) with constant E(η) and D(η).
From Equations 38, γ1(η) > 0 for p(1) ∈ (0, 12 ), γ1(η) < 0 for p(1) ∈ ( 12 , 1),
and γ1(η) = 0 for p = 12 , see also Figures 6, 7. Let us rewrite equation for
γ1 as (4 + N (1)γ21)p(1)2 − (4 + N (1)γ21)p(1) + 1 = 0 and solve the latter p(1) =
1
2 ± 12
√
N(1)γ21
4+N(1)γ21
. Selection of sign and evaluation of root should correspond to
the above γ1 inequalities and probability intervals. Hence,
p(1) =
1
2
− γ1
2
√
N (1)
4 +N (1)γ21
,
p(1)
1− p(1) =
√
4 +N (1)γ21 − γ1
√
N (1)√
4 +N (1)γ21 + γ1
√
N (1)
. (39)
From Equation 37 A(1)q −A(2)q = const1 −
√
const2
√
p(1)N(1)
1−p(1) and
A(2)p = A
(2)
q = A
(1)
q − const1 +
√
const2N (1)
√√√√√4 +N (1)γ21 − γ1√N (1)√
4 +N (1)γ21 + γ1
√
N (1)
. (40)
From Equations 24 and 37 under the specified conditions
A(1)p = A
(1)
q +
√
const2N (1)(4 +N (1)γ21). (41)
Two-point variable vs. constant problems matching E(η) = 200,
√
D(η) = 1600,
A
(1)
q = 0 of Problem 3 are {A(1)p (γ1(η)), 0, p(1)(γ1(η)), 1} vs. {A(2)p (γ1(η)) =
A
(2)
q (γ1(η)), A
(2)
q (γ1(η)), 1, 1}, where p(1)(γ1(η)), A(2)q (γ1(η)), A(1)p (γ1(η)) are
given by Equations 39 - 41. For Problem 3’ the problems with E(η) = −200,√
D(η) = 1600, A(1)p = 0 are {0,−
√
const2N (1)(4 +N (1)γ21), p
(1)(γ1(η)), 1} vs.
{A(2)p = A(2)q , A(2)q (γ1(η)), 1, 1}, Figure 15. In both cases skewness γ1(η) can be
arbitrary. It adds a degree of freedom to influence on a(η) and b(η).
Keeping E(η), D(η), A(1)q intact, variation of skewness γ1(η) changes A
(1)
p (η),
A
(2)
p (η) = A
(2)
q (η), Equations 41, 40, ηmax(η), ηmin(η), amax(η), bmax(η), Equa-
tions 33, 34. Under the specified conditions these equations yield
amax =
√
N (1)
2
(
√
4 +N (1)γ21 + γ1
√
N (1)),
bmax =
√
N (1)
2
(
√
4 +N (1)γ21 − γ1
√
N (1)),
amaxbmax = N
(1).
(42)
A random difference η can be depicted as a horizontal line segment [ηmin, ηmax]
with an inner point E(η). On Figure 16 such segments are plotted relative each
to other for different values of skewness γ1 for Problems 3 and 3’. We see that
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Figure 15: a - A(1)p = 1600
√
4 + γ21 , b - A
(2)
q = −200 + 1600
√√
4+γ21−γ1√
4+γ21+γ1
, c -
A
(1)
q = −1600
√
4 + γ21 , d - A
(2)
q = −1600
√
4 + γ21 + 200 + 1600
√√
4+γ21−γ1√
4+γ21+γ1
, e -
p(1) = 12 (1− γ1
√
1
4+γ21
). Plot is done using Maple 10 from Maplesoft.
Figure 16: Minimum, maximum, and mean values of variables η corresponding
to different values of γ1 with constant
√
D(η) = 1600 and E(η) = 200 in
Problem 3 and E(η) = −200 in Problem 3’. Plot is done using Microsoft Excel.
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Figure 17: a - consta = 2, constb = 21 58
; b - consta = 1 14 , constb = 153.(3). Plot
is done using Maple 10 from Maplesoft.
η overlaps a greater positive area for γ1 = 32 in Problem 3’ than for γ1 = − 32 in
Problem 3. These diagrams support the reflection effect.
Let in a hypothetical case a(γ1) =
amax(γ1)
consta
and b(γ1) =
bmax(γ1)
constb
. Then,
from Equations 42 b(γ1) = N
(1)
constaconstba(γ1)
is a hyperbola. This also creates
a parametric dependence a = a(γ1) and b = b(γ1) and allows to express f (1)
as a function of γ1 for constant E(η) and
√
D(η). Figure 17 illustrates fitting
f (1) = 0.2 in Problem 3 with consta = 2 and constb = 21 58
≈ 1.230769 and
fitting f (1) = 0.92 in Problem 3’ with consta = 1 14 and constb = 153.(3).
More experimental data on fractions of respondents selecting between two-point
random variables is needed to clarify further dependencies discussed so far.
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